

PEASANT ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION
IN THE PHILIPPINES

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POSSIBILITY OF A PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION

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For a quarter century journalists have been announcing the imminent revolution in the Philippines. Social inequality, political corruption, economic difficulties, intellectual discontent, and the existence of rural guerrilla groups appear to support their contention. In this paper I shall briefly survey the major reasons why the revolution has not occurred and then focus on the crucial but neglected issue of the ability of Philippine rural poor¹ to create a strong, revolutionary organization.

A revolution² occurs when a domestic insurgent group displaces a government by means which are illegitimate according to the values of the existing political system and when that group then transforms the fundamental political institutions and values of the society. The conditions under which revolutions occur thus range from the overthrow of a relatively strong government by an even stronger insurgent to the internal disintegration of a government followed by formation of an organization sufficiently strong to impose new institutions and values.

The Philippine government is strong and effective by Asian standards. It is effective in constructing public works,³ effective in overriding regional antagonisms which elsewhere would have led to immobilism,⁴ and effective in controlling its military forces and employing them to defend the government.

Philippine government corruption might appear to belie this effectiveness, but it does not. Corruption does exist and does reduce bureaucratic efficiency and does alienate the middle class, but corruption appears greater in the Philippines than in other developing nations because the free Philippine press exposes and even exaggerates the corruption in ways that are impossible elsewhere. In addition, corruption is in large part the price paid for more important things. Corruption resulted from rapid assimilation of partly trained Filipinos into the bureaucracies after the 1916 Jones Act, from Japanese destruction of relatively competent bureaucracies, from postwar economic difficulties, from the great power of political leaders,⁵ from the political patronage system, and from the value conflict between the mutual aid responsibilities of the villager and the achievement norms applied to the villager-turned-bureaucrat. But Filipinization of the bureaucracies provided valuable experience in self-government. The war with Japan consolidated Filipino nationalism. The great powers of political leaders provide the flexibility and authority necessary to meet the challenges of development.⁷ The patronage system maintains a democratic party system which reaches into every barrio and draws information and political support to the government.⁸ And penetration of the bureaucracies by the ascriptive values of the village makes governmental processes comprehensible to the people and minimizes popular alienation from what could otherwise be cold bureaucrats. A Philippine government free of

corruption would be less like Chicago, which is a corrupt system which works, and more like New York, which is a less corrupt system which doesn't work nearly so well.

In short, the Philippine government is effective in its slow and inefficient way, and the party system roots the government in the people. This government will not disintegrate for internal reasons unless the President or the Constitutional Convention act in extremely foolish and unlikely ways.⁹ Revolution will come--if at all--through homicide rather than suicide. Moreover, if the government did disintegrate in the absence of a disciplined revolutionary organization, provincial rivalries would assert themselves and the political parties and the army would dissolve into feuding groups of families. The result would be Burmese musical chairs, not revolution.

The military has the organization and weapons necessary to overthrow the government. But the small, fragmented military is effectively controlled by Congressional budgetary limitations, by the personal dependence of military leaders on politicians, by the democratic values of some high ranking officers, and by its own lack of revolutionary ideology and political skills. Military takeover is unlikely and would lead to chaos, not revolution.

Other urban groups lack the organization, weapons and strategic position to carry through a revolution. Students indulge in revolutionary rhetoric, and more frequently express discontent than their peers in other nations, but even students basically accept democratic processes and therefore seek reform rather than revolution.¹⁰ The Communist Party is isolated and corrupt. Moreover, any urban revolutionary group would have to construct an organization and an army stronger than the government's organization and army, a difficult task when the government is effective. Filipino revolutionaries, therefore, must depend on the rural areas.

Creation of an effective revolutionary organization and military machine in the rural Philippines would be difficult even with popular support and with guerrilla tactics. Creation of the Red Army in China was possible only because, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out, the central government was divided and large areas between provinces were not under unified control. Even under these favorable conditions the Red Army was in continual danger of extinction until the Japanese destroyed the Kuomintang's urban base and provided a screen behind which the Red Army could operate without fear of Chiang Kai-shek's troops. But in the Philippines, because of the small size and island character of the country, and because of the relative effectiveness of the government, prospective revolutionaries find neither the power vacuums nor sanctuaries. The exception to this generalization was, of course, the period immediately after World War II when the previous Japanese destruction of the government and party system, and the exit of the Japanese, turned the whole country into a power vacuum. Peace returned as soon as minimally effective government was restored.

Supposing that these strategic difficulties were overcome, revolution would require creation of a highly disciplined organization based on the rural poor. Creation and maintenance of a highly disciplined organization, and destruction of the opponent's organizations, constitute the central theme of revolution and the central preoccupation of revolutionaries.¹¹ Discontent without organization is a school of guppies in an Establishment sea, and military strategy not implemented by disciplined organization is just so many squirts of strategic ink. Where the opponent's organization falls apart essentially by itself, as in the French and Cuban revolutions, the organizational requirements of the revolutionaries are reduced. But where the government will not fall apart by itself, as in the Philippines and in China during the period of the Long March, only superior organization offers hope of survival.

The army and professional party members represent only the visible peak of a revolutionary organization. Below them are organized mass groups. Control over such organized mass groups constitutes the goal of revolution and the principal means of waging revolution. Mass organizations serve as reservoirs of personnel and funds and as an intelligence net. The Chinese Communists relied upon an extraordinary network of local organizations, including Young Communists, Young Vanguarders, Children's Brigades, Young Communist Leagues (for women), anti-Japanese societies, nursing schools, weaving schools, tilling brigades, Poor People's Societies, Peasant Guards, and committees for education, cooperatives, military training, political training, land, public health, partisan training, revolutionary defense, enlargement of the Red Army, agrarian mutual aid, and Red Army land tilling, as well as the Communist Party itself and even the old Elder Brothers Society.¹²

The central party cannot be related to an amorphous mass. Its articulation must be to something definite so that clear lines of access and command may be established."¹³ More organized groups are more useful to the party than less organized, and more formally and hierarchically organized groups are more useful than less formally and hierarchically organized ones. But not all social groups are equally organizable and therefore all groups are not equally useful as a mass base. The insurgency which rests itself on a base of lumpenproletarians or scattered and leaderless peasants or anarchistic students will merely expend resources and weaken its central party without corresponding advantages. The crucial question thus becomes: What groups are capable of organization, or susceptible to it? Marx believed that French peasants were incapable of organization, and many Marxists have long decried reliance on the peasants because they extended their mentor's argument to all peasantries. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung's success has inclined observers ranging from Lin Piao to high American officials to believe in the possible efficiency of the model of peasant revolutions throughout the developing world. We need precise theories of capability for organization in order to judge such beliefs.

Organization requires adequate motivation, organizational skills, communications, available time (hereafter availability), and autonomy from social forces which would inhibit organization. Each of these requirements is a logical precondition of organization. Each has been identified by analyses of political parties, unions, social classes, interest groups, governments and societies as a precondition of organization.¹⁴ Each is a continuous,

measurable variable and increments of each increase the maximum degree of organization which a group can obtain. Together with an adequate strategy for using them, these organizational resources are sufficient conditions for organization, and one can reasonably hypothesize that other variables (e.g., education, urbanization,...) influence organizational capability by influencing these variables. The question now becomes: Do Filipino peasants possess adequate resources to build highly disciplined, formal, hierarchical organizations?

Motivation and Autonomy. Analysts of revolution have diagnosed frustration, anomie, self-hate and expediency as the major categories of revolutionary discontent. For peasants as a group, the self-hate hypothesis may be dismissed immediately. Unlike the worker described by Marx and the discontented intellectual described by Hoffer, the peasant comprehends his work, knows the value of his work to himself and society, and is recognized by society as a positive contributor. His identity derives primarily from family and work, and neither inclines him to self-hatred.

Frustration resulting from poverty and inequality is the cliché diagnosis of any rural revolt.¹⁵ But history's most stable societies have been extremely poor and unequal. China, the archetype of peasant revolution, suffered from less rural inequality than many less revolutionary developing societies.¹⁶ Regressions and correlation analyses, as well as less formal analyses, typically obtain contradictory or negative results when they attempt to associate land inequality with rural insurgency.¹⁷ But global correlations do indicate some relation between land inequality and insurgency.¹⁸ The contradictory findings result from improper specification of the statistical model. A model which seeks a simple relationship between a source of discontent and insurgency is testing a spontaneous mass uprising theory. Spontaneous mass uprisings do not occur in most revolutions, and even when they do other variables interact with motivation. Discontent must be supplemented by the other preconditions of organization and mobilized into an organization through an effective strategy. Discontent is not a proximate cause of revolution; it is a resource to be exploited by organizers when organizers and other resources are also present.

Stuck with negative or contradictory findings, empirical theorists have sometimes abandoned references to variables like inequality and moved on to an alternative interpretation of insurgency through sheer organizational dynamism or momentum. But this is not an alternative explanation. It is simply correct specification of the model which should have been tested in the first place. And organization still must be motivated, so the "organizational dynamism" theory does not explain anything. It just restates the problem. Without an explanation of the motivation behind organization, the organizational dynamism theory would lead us to believe that a dynamic organization might come along some day and organize America's wealthy farmers into a Maoist insurgency.

Land inequality is a source of frustration, and Filipino land inequality is worse than pre-1949 Chinese inequality. But it interacts with other factors to be examined shortly, and does not deserve the exclusive position accorded it by American radicals, American conservatives,

and the American middle. And in the Philippines the effects of inequality are muted by a complex network of exchanges of "favors" between rich and poor and by familial ties between rich and poor.¹⁸

Frustrated nationalism has enjoyed a major role in virtually every revolution,¹⁹ and nationalism frustrated by the Japanese legitimated the formation of a Huk organization and army during World War II. Had Americans in the Philippines behaved like the French in Vietnam after the war, nationalism might have become the Huk's fuel supply, but rapid independence precluded such a possibility.

Other social tensions can also provide frustration to motivate political organization. The unjustly famous Confucian family system oppressed Chinese women and children, and Mao exploited family tensions to develop organizations of youth and women that became dependable supporters of the revolution.²⁰ But Filipino families are permissive toward children and more than generous in allotting power to women.²¹ Women's Lib. has no future in the Philippines.

Anomie visits peasant villages as frequently as frustration. Characteristically, economic modernization breaks up extended peasant families, education erodes peasant beliefs, and mobility erodes traditional social controls and subjects the peasant to banditry. But Filipino families are informal and flexible, and therefore are not shattered like their Chinese counterparts. Philippine Catholicism has provided a belief system which adapts passably well to both the modern world and the Filipino peasant's understanding of the world. Whereas declining Confucianism undermined the morale of the old order in China, Catholicism legitimates the Philippine social order, explaining problems and assuring man salvation if he will just believe and behave.²² Likewise, the Filipino politician provides the peasant with a linkage to society through an endless series of favors ranging from a piece of road to mediation of family spats.²³ By contrast, the gentry in China were discredited by the abolition of the examination system, and the political jobs which were supposed to replace the gentry as links between government and village were regarded as disgraceful positions.²⁴ The Filipino peasant is tied to his society, and these ties reduce both his motivation and his autonomy relative to revolutionary organization.

Exceptions to this broad picture arise from the social disruption of World War II, which was particularly intense in Central Luzon. During the war landlords were the most visible of rural groups and they tended to flee to the greater anonymity of Manila or to collaborate rather than die. In their absence, new social patterns coalesced, and the HUKs exploited the collaboration issue; inequality reinforced by collaboration and general social dislocation proved politically potent. Fearful landlords returned with hired thugs and further aggravated class strife. Another consequence of wartime social dislocation was banditry, a negligible pre-war problem²⁵ which has become intense in Manila and Central Luzon since the war. Filipino peasants, like most peasants, see law and order as the primary responsibility of government and regard as evil any government which cannot cope with bandits and guerrillas.²⁶ The government usually cannot catch bandits and guerrillas, and when it does catch them justice is obtained only after

a democratic court procedure which peasants find incomprehensible. Complex American-style court procedures work well except for people who are poor and ignorant. Most rural Filipinos are poor and ignorant--at least ignorant of law. The HUKs have successfully exploited these breakdowns in Central Luzon social structure.

Availability. If the Filipino peasant feels adequately motivated to revolt or otherwise participate in politics, he can find the time. Unlike his counterparts in some areas of the world whose work absorbs all waking hours or whose inadequate diets provide too little energy for any activity beyond that necessary to stay alive, the Filipino has time and energy for extracurricular revolution.

Organizational Skills. Unlike his Chinese counterpart, however, the Filipino peasant is typically unfamiliar with the demands of formal organization and diverse roles, so he may not use available time effectively. Chinese villagers lived within a maze of recreation clubs, Brothers' Societies, self-defense organizations, crop protection associations, landlords' associations, temple associations, secret societies, rainmaking groups, and the like.²⁷ They came from clans which taught the Five Relationships, sometimes had written constitutions, and learned a religion which stressed careful observance of rules of correct form.²⁸ By contrast, the Filipino village has virtually no formal organizations within the village.²⁹ Filipino family structure is informal and flexible.³⁰ Relationships with landlords and politicians consist of informal exchanges of favors.³¹ And even Catholic ritual is interpreted as doing a favor for a saint, who in turn does a favor for someone higher up, in the expectation that favors will be reciprocated. Rural Philippine organizations are typically informal, personalized, and extremely ephemeral, and the rural Filipino lacks experience in roles other than exchange of favors.

Communications. Even if time and skills are available, organizations cannot prosper in the absence of easy communication. In the French wheat economy studied by Marx, peasants were scattered so widely that intense organization was difficult. But a rice economy supports a much denser population and thereby facilitates communication. The Huks communicate among villages at night by opening and closing house window shutters. Both Chinese and Filipino peasants possess this advantage. Likewise, both Filipinos and pre-1949 Chinese share a disadvantage imposed by culture. A style of hinting and ambiguity and avoidance of conflict through euphemism characterize communications in both rural cultures. This style results from carefully inculcated sensitivity to shame and concern for protection of self-esteem. These patterns are important to traditional methods of social control and therefore are difficult to change. Such communications patterns inhibit formal organizational controls. The Chinese managed to change such patterns,³² perhaps because they are less important to Chinese culture, perhaps because the superiority of other aspects of Chinese organizations enabled them to impose stricter controls in such matters. The Huks have been bedeviled by this problem.

Huk Organizations.³³

Like the Chinese Communists, the Huks created mass organizations of peasants, workers, women, youth, and professionals and intellectuals. But the Huk organizations, unlike their Chinese counterparts, proved ephemeral. Supposed to meet once a week, they often met only once a month when an officer from outside the barrio showed up to supervise. Meetings often degenerated into moderately formalized gossip sessions in which the familiar problems of the village were discussed. Real problems were discussed, and real solutions were sometimes found, but the effect on village life was rather like the effect of a New England Town Meeting.

When the Chinese held such meetings, group consciousness developed. Peasants participated in "woe pouring" sessions and at least some became fervent in their hatred of landlords. Women and youth became conscious of the injustices of the traditional family system, and learned to link these injustices with tenancy and imperialism. But in discussion of the analogous Philippine meetings, not a single informant reported any major changes in attitudes resulting from the meetings, and all informants said that the meetings were typically rather relaxed. Women and youth did not express grievances against husbands and fathers. Taruc told me that the professionals and intellectuals were "too individualistic" to form effective organizations. Systematic struggle between peasants and landlords occurred only rarely, in a few barrios in Pampanga. The talents and money of landlords were considered more useful to the Huks than struggle sessions. Landlords were made to understand that they had to cooperate, but official policy was usually to "pamper them." (Taruc's phrase.) In the absence of developing group consciousness, and use of that consciousness in building tough, revolutionary organizations, the creation of mass groups along these lines was a sterile imitation of Chinese practices without practical rationale. The mass organizations apparently provided an effective intelligence net, but did not contribute to a permanent transformation of social structure or political power.

Huk judicial practices were similarly relaxed and un-revolutionary, providing another example of the influence of Filipino rural culture on insurgent organizations. No formal laws were employed and Taruc said he could think of no case which was so complicated that formal laws were necessary. Such a statement suggests that revolutionary ideals deviated very little from traditional ideals. Barrio courts encouraged opponents to sit together and seek mutual agreement. Lacking mutual agreement, the court ruled that death penalties had to be unanimous. Landlords were forced to improve the conditions of their tenants, but tenants were forced to stop the common practice of stealing the landlord's grain. A point was made of never humiliating landlords in public--quite a contrast to Chinese "Speak Bitterness" meetings.

Above the village level the Huks were constantly plagued by factionalism. Horizontal factionalism interfered with coordination among regional leaders; Taruc, although officially Supremo, appears never to have had effective control over many units. Vertical factionalism divided Taruc and the rural insurgents from the urban leaders of the Communist Party. But this vertical factionalism was based on important issues as well as personal factions. Urban leaders called for militarization of the villages along Chinese lines, and Taruc resisted, knowing that this would alienate his peasant support.

By evasion, appearing to acquiesce in Party orders and then not carrying them out, Taruc maintained his position for years but eventually was relieved. Increasing use of terror, in accordance with the wishes of central Party leaders, corresponded with the decline of the Huks. The cold, intellectual, struggle-oriented Maoism of Taruc's successor, Jesus Lava, alienated rural groups and the Huks declined rapidly under his leadership. (They would have declined somewhat regardless of their leader--given their military straits--but all close observers credited Lava with accelerating the decline.) The Huks have subsequently split into several competing factions.

An important consequence of the Huk's organizational inadequacies has been their inability to expand outside regions inhabited by Pampanguenos. Effective confinement to one linguistic group spells death for aspirants to national power, and the Huks have tried to expand but have failed. Their failure cannot be ascribed purely to the admittedly strong regional-linguistic tensions of the Philippines. China confronted tensions which were at least as strong. But the Chinese genius for formal organization enabled them to surmount local sentiments and create a national organization. The Huks's necessary reliance on personal ties confines them to members who can trust one another on the basis of exchange-of-favors rather than a formal relationship to an institution. Thus Philippine society exercises an effective containment policy, a policy broken only when the army foolishly chases the Huks into other regions and thereby creates the same kind of social disruption which nurtured the Huks.

Finally, the informality of Philippine social structure inhibits permanent transformation by revolutionary force. Formal village structures are visible to an outsider and easily dismantled. The Chinese Communists could simply prevent the landlords' associations and other organizations from meeting, and they could then create mass organizations which could institutionalize a new power balance. But informal lines of power are less visible, and it is difficult to cut the vertical Philippine social ties. Permanent social transformation of Philippine villages requires either: (a) redistribution of wealth, including land reform; or (b) change imposed through elections--which require little formal organization of peasants but which engage the organizational power of the government; or (c) application of more force, over a greater period of time, than was necessary in China--a policy the Huks have never been willing or able to implement. These alternatives are not of course mutually exclusive.

The Huks are too woven into the social structure to revolutionize that structure and too woven into it to be excised. They even perform more or less useful functions for Central Luzon society: catching bandits, maintaining reformist pressure on the government, transporting American soldiers from their homes to Clark Air Base, providing bars and brothels for the U.S. Air Force, running the best American-brand gas station in Angeles, and maintaining monopolies for large American corporations which pay them for this service. A wag has suggested that the Americans are the best supporters of the Huks and that the Huks are the best capitalists in the Philippines.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 In this paper, the word "peasant" refers broadly to the lowland rural poor. It is customary, and for many purposes important, to stratify rural poor. But rural revolution does not rest on any single group. "Poor peasants" may (or may not) be most motivated to revolt, but "rich peasants" usually supply crucial leadership skills. The revolutionary sees the village as a reservoir of resources, with different groups supplying different resources. Excessive concern for stratification results from some social scientists' emphasis on motivation to the exclusion of leadership, communications.
- 2 This concept of revolution excludes coups, legal alterations to the constitution, and reforms (which by definition decrease economic, social, or political inequality without transforming political institutions and values). The reference to "means which are illegitimate according to the values of the existing political system" is necessary to exclude democratic or other changes of government policy or personnel; such a reference does not of course imply any judgment by the external observer as to the justice of either the conservative or the revolutionary cause. What is legitimate to the revolutionary is illegitimate to the old system, and vice versa.
- 3 For instance, H.A. Averich, F.H. Denton, and J.E. Koehler, A Crisis of Ambiguity (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970), found the Marcos administration rice, school and road programs effective.
- 4 All available statistical analyses of political activity, democratic and insurgent, point to regional ties as the most significant variable.
- 5 On the history of Philippine bureaucracies, cf. O.D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila, 1957)
- 6 Cf. John H. Romani, The Philippine Presidency (Manila, 1956); Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines (Boston, 1965), Ch. 5.
- 7 On the need for central concentration of power in developing countries, cf. S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), Ch. 3.
- 8 Jose V. Abueva, "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development," East West Center Review (1966). Cf. also Averch et al., op. cit., on rural political attitudes.
- 9 E.G., attempts by the President to perpetuate himself or his wife in office. Also, major reforms can be disruptive, as in the French and 1911 Chinese revolutions.
- 10 Robert O. Tilman, "Student Unrest in the Philippines," Asian Survey (Sept. 1970)
- 11 For organizational approaches to revolution, cf. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, 1966); Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (New York, 1952); Huntington, op. cit.; Barrington

Moore, Political Power and Social Theory (New York, 1965)

- 12 This list is taken, much of it verbatim, from Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1941), pp. 234ff.
- 13 Selznick, op. cit., 81, 97
- 14 Among dozens of others, cf.: Max Weber, Theory of Economic and Social Organization (New York, 1947), 427; cf. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in L.S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels (New York, 1959), 388; S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (New York, Doubleday, 1968).
- 15 For instance, cf. Roy L. Prosterman, "Land Reform as Foreign Aid," Foreign Policy (Spring 1962).
- 16 For some data on land inequality, displayed in a particularly useful fashion, cf. Huntington, op. cit., 382.
- 17 Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Insurgency: the Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics (April 1964).
- 18 Roy Hofheinz, Jr. "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success," in A.D. Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle, 1969); Averch et al., op. cit.; Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency," World Politics (April 1968) and his "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion," American Political Science Review (Dec. 1969); Mitchell's work is challenged in Averch et al., 207n., and in J.M. Paige, "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Reanalysis," World Politics (Oct. 1970). Cf. also Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, 1955).
- 19 Huntington, op. cit., 300ff.
- 20 Cf. deed number seven of the fourteen great deeds listed in Mao's report on Hunan, in his Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York, 1954). Cf. also the descriptions of organization in David and Isabel Crook, Revolution in a Chinese Village (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).
- 21 George M. Guthrie and Pepita Jimenez Jacobs, Child Rearing and Personality in the Philippines (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1966), 115-116 point out that children must obey but are given time to obey. It is clear from their study that Filipino children are not bound by rigid rule systems. With regard to women: the relatives of husband and wife are regarded as of equal significance; village women often manage businesses; urban women are often treasurers and men presidents, with real power often in the hands of the women. Bulateo calls this pattern "achievement through gentleness" in his Symposium on the Filipino Personality (Manila: Psychological Association of the Philippines, 1965), 16. "Traditionally there are few societies in the world which display as much equalitarianism as Philippine societies, either pagan or Christian," according to Robert Fox, "Social Organization," Human Relations Area Files, Area Handbook for the Philippines (New Haven, 1955), I, 420.
- 22 Grossholtz, op. cit., 91-95. Jaime Bulateo, ed., Split Level Christianity (Manila: Ateneo, 1966).
- 23 Cf. M. Hollnsteiner, Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Village (Diliman: Community Development Research Council, 1963), 95, on the diffuseness of the political role. Also Carl H. Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties (New Haven, 1966), 114-117, on the broad popular base of the parties.

- 24 Martin Yang, A Chinese Village (New York, 1965), 117
- 25 Lacking data I base this remark solely on interviews.
- 26 Grossholtz, op. cit., 14. Note also the finding of Averch et al., op. cit., that Pampanguenos rate crime as their second most important problem, unlike other areas.
- 27 Cf. Martin Yang, op. cit., 143, 157ff.; A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover (New York, 1963), 126ff.; also the Crooks, op. cit., passim.
- 28 C.K. Yang, The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution, in his Chinese Communist Society (Cambridge, 1959). On filial piety and identity issues, cf. Robert Lifton, The Psychology of Totalism (New York, 1963), Ch. 19.
- 29 Evidence comes primarily from poblaciones but there would be fewer organizations at barrio level. Hollnsteiner, op. cit., found organizations in Hulo (24-27), but noted their characteristic personalism, factionalism, and ephemerality (Ch. VI). Most organizations she describes (Lions Club, Knights of Columbus...) are local units of extra-village organizations and she does not mention indigenous formal organizations. Moreover a survey of a number of barrios found that most organization like those she describes exist merely on paper. Cf. J. de Young and C.L. Hunt, "Communications Channels and Functional Literacy in the Philippine Barrio," in S.E. Espiritu and C.L. Hunt, eds., Social Foundations of Community Development (Manila, 1964), 263-4
- 30 Cf. Guthrie and Jacobs, op. cit., passim.; and Fox op. cit.
- 31 On relations with landlords cf. F. Lynch, "Social Class in a Bikol Town," in Espiritu and Hunt, op. cit., 164ff. On politicians, cf. Lande, op. cit., who makes this "dyadic relationship" a major theme. The Huks sometimes disrupt relations with politicians in Central Luzon. Relations with Central Luzon landlords are disrupted by greater absenteeism and by greatly reduced percentage of tenants whose landlords are close relatives. On latter points, cf. Area Handbook of the Philippines, op. cit., as excerpted in Espiritu and Hunt, op. cit., 152, and G.F. Rivera and R.T. McMillan, The Rural Philippines (Manila, 1952), 122-3, cited in Lande, op. cit., 96.
- 32 Compare "The Culvert" in B. W. Tuchman, Stilwell and The American Experience in China (New York, 1972), 683-5, with R. Walker's lament about the "replacement of the traditional language of courtesy" in his The Human Cost of Communism in China (Washington, D.C., 1971), 26. I cite this despite severe reservations about many of his findings.
- 33 The following discussion is based on this writer's interviews with Luis Taruc and others in 1967. Limitations of space preclude full citation of relevant books and articles, so I shall confine myself to the outstanding ones: Eduardo Lachica, The Huks (New York, 1971); R.L. Hoeksema, Communism in the Philippines (unpublished Harvard dissertation, 1956); and Victor Lieberman, "Why the Hukbalahap Movement Failed," Solidarity 1, 4 (1966).

ERRATA. Two footnotes are numbered 18. For citations relevant to the second note 18, cf. note 33. Also the paragraph on "Communications" lacks a sentence noting that economic modernization has enhanced rural Filipino communications capacities.