This is a working document. It is reproduced for private circulation only, not for general distribution or publication, and it should not be cited or quoted without the permission of the author.

Hudson Institute Discussion Papers are intended to be used as part of the informal exchange of ideas and information within the Institute's program of studies. They may present tentative ideas or statements designed to provoke controversy, and they do not necessarily represent the considered opinions even of the author.

Discussion Papers are reproduced at the discretion of the author, with no Institute review procedure, and thus no opinions, statements of fact, or conclusions contained in this document can be attributed to the Institute, its staff, its Members, or its contracting agencies.

HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC.
Quaker Ridge Road
Croton-on-Hudson
New York 10520
A NUCLEAR POSTURE FOR ASIA

There are three basic purposes for which nuclear weapons could be employed in Asia or elsewhere. The deployments implied by the different uses often conflict with one another, so it is important to keep the purpose in question quite clear. The first of these purposes is deterrence, that is the presence or threatened use of nuclear weapons to inhibit a potential adversary from taking an action that would damage U.S. or allied interests. The second is active use of nuclear weapons for fighting a war. The third is the use of nuclear weapons for political influence.

The first two uses are familiar to all students of military affairs, but the use of nuclear weapons for political influence requires some comments. Political influence can be acquired from the presence of nuclear weapons, from demonstration use of nuclear weapons, or from threats to employ nuclear weapons. For instance, China might explode a nuclear weapon on an uninhabited island controlled by Taiwan in order to convince the Taiwan government or the Taiwan population that resistance to PRC rule was useless. The United States can signify its continuing interest, and intention to exercise influence over Asian events, by conspicuously deploying nuclear weapons in the region; by doing so it may hope to influence the policies of small powers by convincing them that U.S. interests must be taken into account in policy decisions. Whereas demonstration use and threatened use are perhaps most useful in influencing opponents, presence can be at least equally effective in influencing allies. The presence of nuclear weapons might conceivably convince allies that the United States remains a worthy ally. More particularly the
POTENTIAL PURPOSES FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ASIA

I. DETERRENCE
   A. OF CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS
   B. OF NUCLEAR ATTACKS
   C. OF POLITICAL ACTS

II. DEFENSE
   A. TO PREEMPT IMMINENT NUCLEAR ATTACK
   B. TO RESPOND TO NUCLEAR ATTACK
   C. TO PREVENT CONVENTIONAL DEFEAT
   D. TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE U.S./ALLIED CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE IN SUCCESSFUL CONVENTIONAL BATTLE

III. POLITICAL INFLUENCE
   A. DEMONSTRATION USE
   B. "PRESENCE"
      1. FOR CREDIBILITY
      2. AS INDICATION OF U.S. INTEREST
   C. INHIBIT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
presence of nuclear weapons might be used in order to convince American allies that nuclear proliferation is unnecessary because nuclear attacks would bring automatic U.S. retaliation. The degree to which such uses of nuclear weapons for political influence is likely to be effective is discussed below; our purpose here is merely illustration.

Use of nuclear weapons for deterrence and for political influence typically requires making the presence of the weapons quite visible and frequently requires stationing them in forward positions where serious conflict seems likely to trigger their use early and automatically. On the other hand, use of nuclear weapons for defense generally does not require forward deployment and frequently would be enhanced by concealment of either the presence of the weapons or their precise location.

Within the category of weapons use for active warfighting, there are further distinctions essential to analysis. First, there is nuclear use in response to the nuclear capability of an adversary, either first use for disarming attack or from fear of the consequences of the opponent's first use, or on the other hand, second use in response to the enemy's nuclear initiative. Second, there is use of nuclear weapons to remedy deficiencies in U.S. or allied strength, that is to win or stalemate a war which would otherwise be lost because of insufficient strength. An example of this would be use of nuclear weapons to halt a North Korean attack on South Korea which had achieved surprise and threatened to completely take the Korean peninsula before adequate conventional forces could be brought to bear. Third, there is nuclear use to avoid excessive U.S. or allied casualties in situations where the U.S. or its allies could win, but only at costs judged to be unacceptable. An example of this
third use of weapons would be use of them to prevent sudden destruction of the existing U.S. division in Korea despite confidence in U.S. ability to recoup its losses later regardless of the fate of that particular division.

Five Scenarios for Nuclear Decisions in Asia

1. **Soviet Threats to Japan**

   During 1976 a political crisis in Japan leads to the rise—by democratic means—of a Socialist-dominated coalition government. That government maintains the Security Treaty with the United States, in accordance with the currently stated policy of the Socialist Party, but insists successfully on a program of gradual reduction of U.S. bases in Japan, with half of each kind of U.S. force eliminated by June, 1977. Congressional sentiment against foreign bases, together with a reduced sense of urgency in the Congress about defending Japan, leads to proportionate reductions in U.S. forces in Korea. In accordance with previous trends, the last U.S. troops are withdrawn from Taiwan. Negotiations with the Philippines lead to retention of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, but the Philippine government gains complete access to the bases and an effective veto over U.S. use of Philippine bases.

   The leftist Japanese government, faced by serious dissension from the political right and with doubts about the loyalty of the Self-Defense Forces, moves swiftly to implement its ideological programs in domestic policy but attempts to minimize attacks from the right through appeals to nationalism and the values of national unity. In pursuance of these values, the government takes particularly tough stands on territorial issues, including the Senkaku Islands dispute with Taiwan and the PRC, the
territorial waters disputes with Korea, and the Northern Islands disputes with the Soviet Union. Each of the latter countries, perceiving Japan correctly as militarily weak and politically disunified, hardens its own stance on these issues.

Taiwan, finding itself almost totally isolated diplomatically and increasingly fearful of open conflict with either the PRC or Japan, accelerates its nuclear programs and explodes its first atomic bomb in 1978. The U.S. deplores the explosion, on grounds that nuclear proliferation is generally harmful, but lacks a credible threat of withdrawing military support and is unwilling to employ active military or economic sanctions against Taiwan; thus the Taiwan nuclear weapon program proceeds rapidly. South Korea, faced with increasing diplomatic isolation, reductions of U.S. forces, and threats from all directions, decides to follow the Taiwan example and to build its own nuclear weapons, with a clandestine but generally acknowledged capability achieved by 1979. Against the superior conventional forces of Taiwan and South Korea, now complemented by a primitive nuclear capability, and against the awesome power of the Soviet Union, Japan finds her foreign policy impotent.

Throughout this period Japanese nationalism becomes intensified. Because the Left has been the proponent of anti-military sentiments, it is capable of increasing military budgets—just as Richard Nixon's anti-communism made it possible for him to achieve rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Generally acknowledged foreign policy impotence stimulates public acquiescence in enlarged military budgets. Attempts to mollify the Right stimulate increasing expenditures for
modern arms, and the Left finds it necessary to expand the size of military in order to create positions from which its own men can gain organizational control of Self-Defense Forces.

Throughout the period, Soviet captures of Japanese fishing boats, and Soviet intrusions into Japan's air space and territorial waters, rise rapidly because of the rising salience of the dispute over ownership of the Northern Islands.

The rising disputes with Taiwan, Korea, and the Soviet Union reach a preliminary climax in which a Taiwanese naval force, backed up by threats of a larger clash, expels all Japanese naval forces from the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands and mounts a tiny garrison there, loudly proclaiming military victory over Japan. In Japan the public response is limited to rhetoric, but a massive nuclear weapon program is initiated, accompanied by a major naval buildup.

The Japanese navy begins patrolling areas frequented by Japanese fishing boats, and minor incidents occur between Japanese patrols and Soviet naval vessels attempting to seize Japanese fishing boats. In 1982 a serious naval clash occurs a few days after the first Soviet discovery of the hitherto secret Japanese nuclear weapon development program. A major Soviet naval buildup in the area occurs, with ships from elsewhere in the world being sent to Northeast Asia. Massive military supplies are moved east by airlift and along the Trans-Siberian railroad. Intelligence reports large numbers of Soviet bombers being moved toward the Siberian coast. Over a period of several weeks, it becomes clear that the Soviet Union is planning some massive military action against Japan. It is not clear whether the action will be a preemptive strike against
Japan's nuclear capability, or an attempt to destroy Japan's navy, or a direct invasion of Japan.

The President of the United States holds a meeting of the National Security Council and reaffirms the view that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty remains binding on the United States, that the independence of Japan from foreign hegemony is vital to the security of the United States regardless of the internal complexion of the Japanese government, and that any of the likely Soviet actions against Japan would permanently impair the political independence of Japan. He orders the Department of Defense to prepare to deter any of the postulated Soviet actions and to defend Japan against them if they occur.

2. Attack on South Korea

Immediately after the fall of South Vietnam, there were widespread press reports of North Korean planning for the possible invasion of South Korea. Later press reports indicated that Chinese pressure, and other factors, had ruled out such a possibility. Future events could easily reawaken the possibility of a North Korean invasion of South Korea.

In 1975 a United Nations Assembly voted for the first time history for a North Korean resolution specifying that the U.N. command be dismantled, that U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea, and treating North Korea as the only legitimate representative of Korea. (The United Nations also passed an opposed South Korean resolution.) This could establish a trend toward international isolation of South Korea. Moreover, the Vietnam experience, followed by a likely unsatisfactory outcome in Angola, and possibly by the entry of communists into Western European governments
such as Portugal and Italy, could enhance the West's sense of weakness and greatly encourage aggressive designs of states such as North Korea. Furthermore, it is possible and even likely that, within a few years, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party will lose its three seat majority in the upper house and that eventually a much more leftist coalition will come to power in Japan. After the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung in China, leadership changes are likely which could lead to a substantial degree of Sino-Soviet rapprochement and to further radicalization of the Chinese policy on Korea. All of these events would greatly enhance North Korea's sense that it might be able to invade the South.

Within South Korea political tensions grow. Extremely authoritarian policies lead to dissent, and this dissent in turn stimulates more authoritarian policies, which themselves enhance dissent. The combination of authoritarianism and political dissent cause rising disenchantment among the U.S. Congress and public opinion. U.S. posture as a result grows somewhat more remote from South Korea, and this increases Park Chung Hee's insecurity and creates further stimulus to authoritarian policies. The result is overthrow of Park Chung Hee, followed by a period of political chaos during late 1977. This, together with international events, precipitates a sudden surprise invasion of South Korea by the North in January, 1978, backed by parallel Soviet and Chinese assertions that South Korea had invaded the North and that they were duty bound to ensure the success of North Korea's virtuous counterattack.

Intelligence reports note movements of North Korean troops prior to the attack, but the movements prove so similar to previous exercises that the likelihood of a real invasion is totally discounted until after the
fact, and the North Koreans in effect achieve total surprise. Within 24 hours it becomes clear that the U.S. faces total and sudden destruction of its division within South Korea, followed within a few weeks by total loss of South Korea to the North. The President of the United States discovers, moreover, that not only does he face annihilation or abject surrender of an American division, he also faces imminent North Korean capture of U.S. nuclear weapons unless those weapons are either used or evacuated. Official and press reports indicate that use of the weapons against a purely North Korean invasion would bring an angry response from a majority of the domestic public and from most other governments around the world, but also that withdrawing the weapons under fire would likely do permanent damage to U.S. credibility in Europe and Japan. On the second day of deliberations, the President receives intelligence reports that the South Koreans are dissatisfied with the U.S. reaction to the invasion and, convinced that no adequate support will be forthcoming from the United States, seem to be preparing to capture U.S. nuclear weapons and to deploy them unilaterally. Intelligence reports ROK forces can overcome PAL systems.

3. **Korean and Taiwanese Invasions**

A North Korean attack occurs as outlined above, except that the South Koreans do not act to seize U.S. nuclear weapons. Although all U.S. forces have been removed from Taiwan, the Security Treaty remains in force and the U.S. President has continued to make statements confirming that the U.S. will not tolerate any forceable seizure of Taiwan.

At a time when the South Korean situation is increasingly desperate, and the U.S. is still debating its best course of action, it becomes clear that adequate conventional military supplies to turn the battle for South
Korea around will be extremely difficult to deliver in time. At this time the U.S. receives two simultaneous broadcasts, one from Taipei announcing that Taiwan's troops are moving rapidly to contain a surprise air and sea invasion by the People's Republic of China, and one from Peking announcing that the final phase of the struggle of the liberation of Taiwan has begun with the initial landing of forces in Taiwan to support an alleged uprising of native Taiwanese against the government.

The American people are frightened and revolted by the double invasion, and the President of the United States announces America's intention to defend both South Korea and Taiwan with all necessary force.

4. Korean War: Japanese Involvement

Beginning with its partial defeat in its contest over resolutions with North Korea in the United Nations during late 1975, South Korea finds itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. Third World countries withdraw their embassies in favor of North Korea, partly because of reactions to the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, partly because of North Korean bribery, and partly because of a widespread belief that only a unified Korea can be peaceful and only North Korea can unify Korea. U.S. reverses in Angola, together with a deliberately abrasive U.S. diplomacy in the United Nations, reduce world support for U.S. policies in general and particularly for its presence in Korea. These factors, together with reactions against the Angola situation, increasingly turn the American public against a continued presence in South Korea. (Polls in 1975 had already shown a majority of the American public against U.S. defense of South Korea.) Statements by Governor Jimmy Carter and other candidates for the Presidency lead to a widespread expectation in the United States
and abroad that U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Korea, and these expectations become self-fulfilling. In January of 1977 a new President takes office and directs the Pentagon to draw up plans for eliminating the U.S. presence in South Korea within two years, while retaining the treaty commitment.

Contrary to expectations of many, the Park Chung Hee government maintains its political stability. Moreover, it guesses correctly that the world economy will reflate during 1976 and makes enormous investments based on such a calculation. The gamble pays off and the South Korean economy booms back to a 12 to 15% annual GNP growth rate beginning in mid-1976. North Korea continues to have great difficulties in restoring economic growth and in repaying debts to Japan, France and other nations. (During 1975 North Korea began to default on many of its international loans.)

Despite the superior South Korean performance, and to some extent because of it, North Korea escalates its belligerent rhetoric and initiates a series of confrontations with the South. North Korean aircraft repeatedly challenge South Korea in substantial numbers. On one single day six South Korean patrol boats are sunk. Fire fights occur repeatedly in the DMZ. South Korean forces suddenly drive forward, without warning to the United States or to anyone else, moving 15 miles into North Korea the first day and an average of 5 miles on each succeeding day for two weeks.

China and the Soviet Union both denounce what they call South Korean imperialist aggression and call for a broad united front to struggle against the imperialists. All the Arab countries and a substantial majority of the Third World side with North Korea diplomatically.
Scattered reports of the presence of Soviet advisors in the North appear, both in intelligence reports and in the world press, but these meet with considerable skepticism. The U.S. moves quickly to reinforce South Korea, initially with maximum available logistic support, and increasingly with troops. After a stormy debate in Japan, accompanied by riots which shake the country's political foundations, the Japanese government just barely approves U.S. use of its bases in Japan for support of South Korea.

North Korean submarines launch major attacks on U.S. shipping. Initially achieving surprise, they cripple and almost sink a carrier and completely destroy several ships in the carrier's task force. The North Koreans are aided by large numbers of Russian submarines in the area which report all U.S. fleet movements to them and frequently decoy U.S. forces.

South Korean forces continue to drive northward successfully for 30 days, at which time an entire platoon of Soviet infantry is captured. Immediately after the first reports in the Western press of the capture, the Soviet Union denies the presence of Soviet forces, but within a week Pravda announces the formation of volunteer units numbering some 250,000 highly trained soldiers to defend North Korean socialism against the imperialist invaders. The U.S. responds by raising its troop commitments to South Korea and by declaring a policy of sinking all hostile submarines in the vicinity of Korea.

The Soviet Union responds by declaring that the war must be carried home to the aggressors and launches massive conventional air attacks on U.S. basing facilities in Japan. Intelligence reports indicate the formation of a large Soviet naval task force which could be used simply
to combat American sea power in the vicinity of Korea, but which could also provide the basis for an invasion of Japan.

5. **Sino-Soviet War**

After the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese leadership greatly accelerates the trends toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union which began with the mildly cool treatment of President Ford's visit to Peking in late 1975, and the release of a Soviet helicopter crew previously held as a result of a border incident. However, an uprising begins against Soviet hegemony in the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Chinese feel obliged to offer substantial support to that uprising. Soon afterwards a similar uprising against Chinese hegemony develops, with strong Soviet encouragement, in Sinkiang. The mood in both Moscow and Peking shifts toward extreme fear for the integrity of each country respectively. Attempts to moderate the crisis are swamped by the apparent necessity on both sides of rushing vast reinforcements from other areas to protect the country, and by the independent initiatives of local commanders. Soon major conventional warfare is underway at numerous points along the border. The Soviet Union decides that the situation is out of control and strikes suddenly at China's nuclear weapons, destroying about 85 percent of them. Soviet conventional forces concentrate on an invasion of Manchuria and quickly slice deeply into that part of China. Fighting spills over into North Korea and threatens to spread a Sino-Soviet war into South Korea.

Chinese forces, faced with massive conventional and nuclear attacks, fall back far more rapidly than the world expects, and the U.S. faces a situation in which it appears that without substantial assistance China will fall under quasi-permanent hegemony of the Soviet Union. The U.S.
moves to provide financial support for China and sends reinforcements to Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Financial assistance proving inadequate, the U.S. begins to channel substantial quantities of intelligence and of conventional weaponry to the Chinese. However, it is clear from the beginning that conventional armament will not protect China against a rapidly advancing Soviet force, using carefully calibrated but unlimited nuclear power.

The Soviet Union discovers American support of China and asserts that, if such support is not immediately discontinued, the Soviet Union will have to consider the United States a co-belligerent of China. In response, the U.S. President replies that it always has been, and remains, a vital interest of the United States that a balance of power be maintained in Asia, and that Soviet hegemony over most of China is totally unacceptable.

6. Soviet Intervention in India

In late 1976 three provinces in different parts of India revolt against the central government. Missteps by Mrs. Gandhi lead to a situation in which the country is divided among two massive insurgencies, each supported by a substantial proportion of the Indian army, and an Indian government which is by itself incapable of defeating either one of the insurgencies. Warfare breaks out on a massive scale, killing 400,000 people in the first three months of the fighting.

The Soviet Union accuses the United States and China of having fostered the civil war and, invoking the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, declares that it has a duty to defend the Indian nation against subversion. The Soviet Union sends substantial supplies by sea, but emphasizes an airlift from the Soviet Union to bases in Egypt and Yemen and hence to
New Delhi and other airports under central government control. The
central government's forces, having hitherto been driven back, begin a
drive forward in several areas as a result of Soviet armament. Coinci-
dently a major unit of the central government's army is trapped and on
the verge of total annihilation. Loss of such a large unit could prove
fatal to the central government, and, when all hope of adequate reinforce-
ment has passed, two nuclear explosions occur which annihilate most of
the massed opposition to the central government's threatened unit.

The Indian central government forces take the offensive with massive
early success. Responding to Pakistani support of one of the insurgencies,
a major Indian central government force drives toward the capitol of
Pakistan. Iran announces that it will send weaponry and perhaps troops
to support Pakistan, and various Moslem countries of the Middle East pro-
claim the necessity of supporting Pakistan. Several Soviet divisions move
rapidly toward the Iranian border.

The United States confronts the likely loss of the entire Indian sub-
continent to communism and to temporary Soviet hegemony, a dangerous pre-
cedent for the use of nuclear weapons, and the possible permanent sub-
ordination of Iran to Soviet hegemony. Moreover, for the first time in a
quarter century, the U.S. possesses a clear opportunity to align itself
with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East in common cause against
the Soviet Union and with Chinese support for the U.S. position.

Discussion of Contingencies

The contingencies in Asia which could conceivably involve nuclear
weapons are listed in the accompanying chart on "Potential Nuclear Conting-
gencies in Asia." The first category of such contingencies consists of
I. POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPON CONTINGENCIES

A. SOVIET OR CHINESE ATTACK ON JAPAN

B. FUTURE TAIWAN NUCLEAR THREATS TO JAPAN
   -- E.G., OVER SENKAKU ISLANDS

C. SINO-INDIAN WAR

D. CHINA THREATENS OR ATTACKS S.E. ASIAN COUNTRY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
   -- EXTREMELY UNLIKELY
   -- BUT NOTE PRC TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMS
   -- PROBLEM OF DETERRING THE SELF-DETERRED

E. CHINESE NUCLEAR THREATS OR CHINESE ATTACK ON TAIWAN

F. INDIA THREATENS OR ATTACKS A NEIGHBOR WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

G. SINO-SOVET WAR

H. SOVIET ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE OR U.S.
   -- SECOND FRONT USE

I. KOREAN WAR
   1. NORTH ATTACKS SOUTH
   2. SOUTH ATTACKS NORTH WITH BAD RESULTS
   3. NORTH/S.U. OR NORTH/PRC ATTACH SOUTH

J. PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES
   1. GENERAL INHIBITION
   2. AGGRESSIVE NUCLEAR TAIWAN
   3. AGGRESSIVE NUCLEAR REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   4. RIGHT WING OR LEFT WING NUCLEAR JAPAN

K. WEAPON CAPTURE CONTINGENCIES
   -- ATTEMPTED SEIZURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ALLY OF U.S.
   -- THREATENED SEIZURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY HOSTILE POWER.

II. A PRINCIPLE UNLIKELY TO BE INFRINGED BY ANY U.S. PRESIDENT:

   -- NO FIRST USE AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR POWERS
   -- BUT SHOULD THIS BE MADE EXPLICIT POLICY?

III. REMARKS

A. OF THE ABOVE, ONLY DEFENSE OF JAPAN AGAINST U.S.S.R. OR PRC ATTACK,
   OPENING SECOND FRONT AGAINST U.S.S.R., AND POSSIBLY ASSISTANCE TO
   PRC AGAINST SOVIET ATTACK, CONSTITUTE CONTINGENCIES WHERE U.S.
   PRESIDENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO PERMIT U.S. NUCLEAR USE.

B. IN (A), ONLY DEFENSE OF JAPAN--IF THAT--SEEMS PRIMA FACIE TO
   REQUIRE FORWARD SITING.
attacks by nuclear powers on other countries. Since warfare initiated by a nuclear power always carries with it the possibility of escalation to nuclear weapons, contemplation of such escalation by our side must be automatic. Included in this category would be a Soviet or Chinese attack on Japan, a Sino-Soviet war, a Sino-Indian war, threats or attacks by China or India on their neighbors, and nuclear use or nuclear threats by new nuclear powers.

A Soviet attack on Japan would, like a Soviet attack on China, and like Chinese or Soviet attacks on the U.S., directly threaten vital U.S. interests. Soviet attacks on Japan would raise precisely the same questions raised by similar events in Europe. Could the United States, in response to an attack on interests acknowledged to be vital, defend a foreign country at the risk of retaliation against American cities? Certainly the requirements of deterrence demand that either the U.S. maintain conventional forces adequate to defend Europe and Japan against such attacks, or that we assume a stated policy of willingness to respond to such attacks with nuclear weapons. In Europe there is some possibility of defending the region with existing conventional forces, reinforced by further conventional forces from the United States; this possibility derives both from the substantial capabilities of Western European nations themselves and from the enormous U.S. forces present in Europe. There is no counterpart to such defensive capabilities in Japan. Japanese forces are severely limited by ideology and by the American-imposed Constitution, and U.S. forces in the region and available by transport are inadequate for sustained defense. Thus, in the unlikely event of Soviet attack on Japan, the primary military recourse would have to be to nuclear weapons.
This recourse is substantially complicated by the fact that Japan would find it politically intolerable to have nuclear weapons stored on Japanese territory or even openly brought through Japan in transit. Thus, whatever nuclear weapons are to be used in defense of Japan must be stored elsewhere, either on foreign bases or on U.S. soil or on ships. Basically the same considerations apply in the event of Sino-Japanese war, except that Chinese nuclear forces are much weaker, as are her naval and air forces, and therefore the problems of defense are essentially simplified.

The necessity of having adequate logistic means for transporting sufficient numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles to defend Japan in the event of an actual attack is supplemented by the special needs of assuring the Japanese that Chinese, Soviet, and--conceivably in the future--Taiwanese, attacks are credibly deterred. Despite the Japanese aversion to use, possession, or even transit, of nuclear weapons, the Japanese government understands the necessity for nuclear deterrence and, in the event of war, for nuclear warfighting. From this understanding proceeds a frequent demand for reassurance that "all kinds" of weapons would be used in the United States to defend Japan. In an era when U.S. adversaries are manifestly becoming stronger and more influential, and in which doubts regarding U.S. morale and military will are overwhelmingly salient in Asia and particularly in Japan, the problems of deterrence prove even more complex than the problems of potential warfighting. More precisely, the problems of reassurance to U.S. allies become even more complex than either warfighting or deterrence of adversaries.

All of the more obvious forms of reassurance to Japan are ruled out by Japanese refusal to have nuclear weapons stored on their territory, and
by the explosive impact on some sectors of Japanese public opinion of even suggestions that some U.S. warships might be carrying nuclear weapons. Placement of nuclear weapons in Taiwan would be regarded by the Japanese as undesirably provocative of the People's Republic of China, and placement of nuclear weapons in Korea would be regarded as dangerous to Japan itself because of the perceived risk of Japan's becoming embroiled in a Korean conflict through American use of Japanese bases. For most Japanese the latter issue, namely the possibility of Japan's becoming involved in nuclear warfare between the United States and some other party because of American bases in Japan, is the preeminent nuclear consideration. Except in extremely limited military and militarily-conscious circles, the Japanese are far less interested in the prospect that U.S. regional nuclear forces might prove inadequate. Thus the requirements of reassurance to the Japanese boil down, not to a major, highly visible stationing of nuclear weapons in the region, but to statements of American willingness to defend Japan against nuclear attack, to expression of an adequate theory for such defense, to minimizing those forms of presence seen as provocative by the Japanese, to maintaining a global nuclear balance with the Soviet Union, to demonstrating adequate American will to back up American commitments, to facilitating Chinese independence of the Soviet Union, and to avoidance of counterproductive involvements like Vietnam. To the extent that some form of nuclear presence is needed to reassure the Japanese, awareness of the presence within the region of nuclear-armed submarines, and continuation of the current ambiguity regarding the armaments of U.S. surface naval forces, is probably the maximum necessary.
REASSURING THE JAPANESE OF U.S. CREDIBILITY

I. SOME OPTIONS NOT REASSURING TO MOST JAPANESE
   A. STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN
   B. STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TAIWAN OR KOREA
   C. OVERT EMPHASIS ON NAVAL NUCLEAR POWER

II. A KEY FEAR:
    FOR A MAJORITY OF JAPANESE, THE KEY NUCLEAR FEAR IS NOT FOREIGN
    ATTACK, BUT INVOLVEMENT IN A NUCLEAR WAR OVER KOREA OR TAIWAN OR
    BECAUSE OF U.S. BASES IN JAPAN.

III. SOME SENSIBLE POLICIES OF REASSURANCE
   A. REITERATE U.S. OBLIGATION TO DEFEND JAPAN "WITH ALL WEAPONS"
   B. MAINTAIN ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND REINFORCEMENT POTENTIAL
   C. ASSURE EXISTENCE OF AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF DEFENDING JAPAN
   D. MAINTAIN GLOBAL NUCLEAR BALANCE WITH U.S.S.R.
   E. FACILITATE CHINESE INDEPENDENCE OF U.S.S.R.
   F. AVOID POSTURES THE JAPANESE WOULD SEE AS PROVOCATIVE OF PRC
      OR U.S.S.R.
      -- E.G., MOVING NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO TAIWAN
   G. HONOR COMMITMENTS WORLDWIDE; AVOID COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COMMITMENTS
   H. FOSTER INDIRECT AWARENESS OF ADEQUATE MOBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR
      FORCES.
Sino-Indian war presents more complicated considerations. India is allied with the Soviet Union and takes extremely anti-American posture in international affairs at the moment. Moreover, military exchanges between China and India can take place under conditions where fault is very hard to determine. In the years since the Chinese Revolution and since India's independence, China has certainly proved no more aggressive than India, and in recent years India has expanded by force of arms whereas China has not. The reference of course is to Indian takeover of Goa and Sikkim, to the continued Indian holding of Kashmir, and to the invasion of Pakistan which led to the creation of Bangladesh. Moreover, in the 1962 war between India and China, India was the country which refused to negotiate, although the Chinese were willing to commit themselves beforehand to the status quo as a basis of negotiation, and Indian troops fired first. (China built a road in territory which was on the Indian side of traditional borders, but India's refusal to negotiate made such a course easier and more legitimate for the Chinese than it would otherwise have been.) Thus, unlike virtually every other situation in Asia where a communist power confronts a non-communist power, in a Sino-Indian war there could be no automatic presumption that the aggressive initiative came from China.

Nonetheless, the United States would have a substantial interest in deterring or terminating a nuclear clash between these two large powers, both because of avoidance of nuclear clashes is automatically in the U.S. interest, and because a serious clash might well drive India and the Soviet Union much closer together and precipitate the possibility of

*Cf. Neville Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon, 1971).*
large-scale Sino-Soviet warfare. For all these reasons, the U.S. might find at some point that an ability to threaten repercussions against either side for use of nuclear weapons would be useful. Nonetheless, (1) the probability of a very large-scale, and especially nuclear, clash is sufficiently low, (2) the direct stakes to the U.S. in such a conflict would also be sufficiently low, and (3) the likelihood that the U.S. would find direct military intervention the optimal policy is so low, that no large-scale preparations for involvement in such a conflict seem justified.

Chinese or Indian threats against smaller neighbors present, paradoxically, an issue of larger significance for the U.S. and one which is perhaps more easily prepared for. The U.S. has a very large interest in rendering nuclear weapons as useless as possible in confrontations between large states and small states. In the first place, if nuclear weapons were to become effective means for subordinating small powers to large powers, the possibility of maintaining an open world would virtually disappear. All the non-nuclear powers would quickly become subordinates or client states of nuclear powers, or they would have to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This raises the second point, namely that unless nuclear weapons are effectively neutralized as instruments of political exploitation, nuclear proliferation could rapidly become nearly universal. Such proliferation would render international politics much more dangerous and raise the costs of actual warfare to an unacceptable extent. Third, and perhaps least important, the nuclear powers involved, namely China and India, are both relatively hostile to the United States, and the smaller states generally take a much friendlier attitude toward the United States.
Fortunately, a generalized inhibition against big power use of nuclear weapons against small states is beginning to become institutionalized, so the problem is to reinforce an existing trend rather than to reverse a deteriorating situation. This problem, however, raises nuances which could be crucial for some aspects of U.S. nuclear deployments. In the first place, although the big powers are largely self-deterred from employing nuclear weapons against smaller states, the smaller states can never be sure of this and need some reassurance if they are not to be cowed by the nuclear power of their larger neighbors. Thus, even though it is unlikely in the extreme that China would ever attack Thailand with nuclear weapons, it is important for Thailand to have formal or informal U.S. assurances that nuclear threats or attacks by China will be deterred or counteracted. To make these reassurances credible it is probably useful to have some kind of nuclear power conspicuously available. This implies, for instance, that ships which are widely understood to carry nuclear weapons might constitute a beneficial form of presence, even if only on intermittent visits to, for instance, the vicinity of Thailand. There are corresponding costs, of course, to publicizing the fact that particular ships carry nuclear weapons, since these ships would henceforth be denied entry into Japanese (and probably other) ports. However, this problem can presumably be solved through use of informal and indirect forms of communication.

A further complication derives from the extent of Chinese territorial waters claims. Chinese claims to sovereignty over the ocean and

---

*Numerous interviews and press discussions substantiate that, for instance, Filipino, Thai, and Taiwanese leaders do not understand the extent of, or reasons for, big power self-deterrence.
its seabed stretch virtually to the coasts of Malaysia and cover the Spratly, Paracel, Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Islands between China and insular Southeast Asia. The resources under, and in the vicinity of, these areas claimed by China are likely to prove to constitute enormous sources of mineral wealth in the relatively near future, and the issue of sovereignty over such regions is no longer the dormant issue it was only a few years ago. Moreover, China is building a substantial navy. It is therefore conceivable that a confrontation could take place between China and a Southeast Asian country, or between China and Japan, or China and the U.S., and that such a conflict could start from low levels of violence and escalate into nuclear threats. The precise nature and the degree of intransigence of Chinese claims are not well understood at this time. The Chinese have been quite reasonable in negotiating other boundary and fishing rights disputes. But Chinese territorial waters claims are prima facie unreasonable, so, until it is clear that conflicts due to these claims are entirely unlikely to escalate to serious levels, it seems wise for the United States to maintain a major naval capability to deny excessive Chinese claims and, given Chinese nuclear capabilities, it is justifiable for the United States to ensure that its own capabilities include a nuclear arm.

The possibility of Sino-Soviet war raises crucial questions of nuclear strategy. Along with the possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East, Sino-Soviet warfare carries with it perhaps the greatest danger of global nuclear warfare. The probability of Sino-Soviet war is fairly low and probably declining, but it is one of those overwhelmingly important contingencies which cannot be neglected. It is very much
in the U.S. interest for China and the Soviet Union to remain relatively hostile to one another, and minor clashes do not damage the U.S. national interest, but all-out warfare would carry substantial dangers for the United States. The first of these is that China, the weaker of the two powers, would be so seriously defeated as to become part of the Soviet Union's circle of satellites. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might assume control of huge portions of China's territory, including all of the territory adjacent to Korea, all of China's Manchurian industrial base, and a substantial proportion of the oil and other resources now controlled by China. If the Soviet Union could establish such control and maintain it for an historical period of time, the consequence would be a shift in the global balance of power enormously detrimental to the United States.

A second, and perhaps even more dangerous, potential outcome of full-scale Sino-Soviet war would be protracted warfare in which both sides became terribly weakened. On the face of it, such an outcome appears highly desirable for the United States. However, it is likely that such fighting would spill over into Korea or Taiwan and possibly endanger U.S. positions or U.S./Japanese interests to an extent which would make U.S. involvement hard to avoid. Moreover, it is likely that East European states would choose such a time to assert their independence through open revolt, and it would not be at all surprising for a Soviet Union in such straits to feel that it had to respond with nuclear weaponry. While the potential in such a situation for improvement in the freedom of the East Europeans would be universally welcomed, the danger that nuclear warfare would engulf Western Europe and eventually the United States would be so high as to make this particular path toward Eastern Europe's liberation an excessively dangerous one.
How then can the United States deter Soviet attacks on China and cope with attacks which might occur? This question must be answered in a situation where it appears that both Chinese and Soviet military goals on their mutual border are primarily defensive. Thus, the principal dangers of full-scale warfare therefore derive from excessive weakness or fear on one of the sides, or from excessive opportunity offered by instability on one side of the border. Secession of one of China's provinces or regions, or a violent attempt to reorder the domestic politics of outer Mongolia, are the stuff out of which Sino-Soviet war could evolve. Likewise, warfare could result from the consequences of Sino-Indian war, or from the unlikely possibility of Soviet alliance with Taiwan.

Since most of the problems are likely to arise on the Chinese side of the border, the principal deterrent to warfare is Chinese strength. Moreover, the principal Chinese weak points derive from economic and technological inadequacies, rather than from basically military causes. It follows that a U.S. policy of maintaining non-hostile diplomatic relationships and reasonably cooperative economic relationships with the People's Republic of China is the best long-run strategy for avoiding both Sino-Soviet warfare and potential Soviet hegemony or excessive influence over Chinese policy. No conceivable local U.S. military forces are likely to provide any credible deterrence or any warfighting leverage in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Providing China with intelligence data and with modern technology in the event of imminent war might greatly strengthen China, and clear notice that such assistance might be available might prove to have considerable deterrent value. General
expressions of U.S. concern, and of U.S. unwillingness to have either
country dominate the other, could strengthen a weak Chinese backbone in
times of difficulty and could engage global U.S. strategic power to some
minor extent as a deterrent. To the extent contingency plans might be
prepared for warfighting, the principal emphasis should almost certainly
be on ways to assist indirectly the Chinese military effort rather than
to engage the United States directly.

Nuclear weapons might prove particularly important in the event of
a Soviet attack on Western Europe, on Middle Eastern friends of the
United States, on U.S. forces elsewhere in the world, or on the U.S.

Itself. In the event of such a war, it would be important for the United
States' posture to fulfill two somewhat contradictory requirements: (1)
to ensure that U.S. interests in Asia could not be held hostage or used
to divert U.S. efforts from a more crucial friend elsewhere; and (2) to
have the capability to make Asia a second front, dividing Soviet energies.
The first requirement implies an ability to snuff out local conflicts with
extreme efficiency in the event of a primary crisis elsewhere. For instance,
following the escalation of a conflict in Europe to nuclear level, the
Soviet Union might encourage or even force Kim Il-sung to launch an attack
on South Korea in an effort to divide U.S. energies. In such an event,
the U.S. would need either to institute a holding option, a choice which
looks terribly expensive and costly in manpower given the nature of modern
warfare, or to employ more decisive weapons than would otherwise be
acceptable in order to terminate the conflict quickly. More precisely,
the U.S. needs contingency plans for rapid, low-cost termination of a
Korean conflict in the event that it is not the principal focus of U.S.
attention, and it also needs a plan for effective reinforcement of Japan's defenses and dramatic improvement of the U.S. deterrent of attacks on Japan. The second requirement implies the need for a capability to supply and re-supply China at a rapid rate, for a capability to locate and destroy Soviet naval forces in the Pacific Ocean with utmost rapidity, for capability to eliminate any Soviet bases which might be built in Indochina, and for a capability to deter or interfere with Soviet re-supply of its own or allied forces supplying one side in an Indian war through transport from the Middle East.

Korea provides a particularly provocative case where an entire range of potentially nuclear contingencies could occur, and for this reason Korea provides an important case study for extended discussion of the issues surrounding U.S. nuclear posture. There are numerous suggested reasons for stationing or employing nuclear weapons in South Korea, each of which is listed in the accompanying chart.

A principal reason for contemplating the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea would be to deter attacks by any parties—namely North Korea, the People's Republic of China, or the Soviet Union—on South Korea itself. It is almost certain that having U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea would add somewhat to deterrence of the kind desired, and if one could somehow obtain absolute assurance that the deterrence would be totally successful in all circumstances, then such stationing of nuclear weapons would prove absolutely uncontroversial. However, no deterrence is perfect and therefore one must worry about the consequences of a failure of deterrence. In particular if deterrence were to fail, a U.S. President would face, assuming current conventional
COMMONLY SUGGESTED REASONS FOR STATIONING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ROK

A. DETER ANY ATTACKS ON ROK (BY DPRK OR PRC OR U.S.S.R.)
   -- NON-CONTROVERSIAL IN ITSELF, BUT CONTROVERSIAL IN POTENTIAL
   CONSEQUENCES

B. DEFEND ROK AGAINST DPRK/PRC OR DPRK/U.S.S.R. ATTACK
   -- MORE CONTROVERSIAL THAN U.S. FIRST USE IN EUROPE
   -- POSSIBLE NUCLEAR RETALIATION BY PRC OR U.S.S.R.

C. DEFEND ROK AGAINST DPRK ATTACK (MOSTLY LIKELY THREAT)
   -- EXTREMELY CONTROVERSIAL
   -- U.S. LOST 50,000 MEN IN KOREA AND AGAIN IN VIETNAM WITHOUT
     RESORTING TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS
   -- BUT THREAT IN FUTURE MIGHT BE LOSS OF LARGE NUMBERS IN A
     MATTER OF DAYS, NOT YEARS. (WOUlD THIS BE DECISIVE?)
   -- ALSO, UNLIKE VIETNAM, A KOREAN WAR WOULD PROVIDE MANY
     APPROPRIATE NUCLEAR TARGETS

D. STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO FACILITATE JAPAN'S DEFENSE AGAINST
   U.S.S.R. ATTACK
   -- CAN'T STORE THEM IN JAPAN
   -- ARE THERE ADVANTAGES OVER GUAM, HAWAII, CONUS AND/OR
     CARRIER STORAGE? (PROBABLY NOT.)*
   -- SHOULD RETARGETING FOR THIS PURPOSE OCCUR?

E. COMPLICATE SOVIET CALCULATIONS IN PLANNING ATTACK ON PRC
   -- VERY DUBIOUS RATIONALE

F. PROVIDE SECOND FRON'T THREAT IN EVENT OF U.S.S.R. PRESSURE ON
   EUROPE
   -- ANY ADVANTAGES OVER CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN KOREA PLUS
     NUCLEAR FORCES IN CONUS OR NUCLEAR-ARMED B-52s IN GUAM?

G. REDUCE ROK INCENTIVE TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
   -- BUT NOTE DANGER OF BECOMING ROK PAWN
   -- CONVENTIONAL PRESENCE PROBABLY ADEQUATE

H. POSSIBLE SIOP USES
   -- NOT NEEDED

* JAPAN COULD HOLD OUT FOR WEEKS, AND WEAPONS COULD BE TRANSFERRED
  IN DAYS. HOWEVER, NOTE U.S. NEED TO MAINTAIN AIR ACCESS.
inadequacies, a painful choice between immediate use of the weapons and the alternative of withdrawing them under fire. Withdrawal under fire is of course possible, but would also be extremely damaging to national credibility and to national morale, especially if the withdrawal implied loss of the war or acceptance of extremely heavy casualties. Therefore, pressure to employ the weapons militarily would be extremely strong.

Under what conditions, then, could nuclear weapons actually be used in Korea? The most likely attacker would be North Korea acting alone. But there are important alternative possibilities that the North Koreans would attack in alliance with either the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union. Against the latter coalitions, nuclear weapons would be far more acceptable than against North Korea alone. However, it is worth noting that first use of nuclear weapons in Korea, even against a coalition involving a superpower, would be more controversial than first use of nuclear weapons in Europe against a Soviet attack, and first use in Europe is an extremely controversial policy. Moreover, use of nuclear weapons would invite nuclear retaliation by the other side against U.S. forces in Korea, against U.S. bases in Japan, against U.S. facilities in Guam, or even against the U.S. mainland. Thus a Korean war involving a big power adversary could justify U.S. nuclear strikes but would not necessarily do so.

Against North Korea alone, employment of nuclear weapons would be controversial in the extreme. It would set precedents for nuclear warfare in smaller states and would enhance nuclear proliferation globally. It would stimulate outrages in the U.S. and abroad, both on purely humanitarian grounds (as in John Hersey's book, Hiroshima) and on the
speeches but politically potent grounds that such attacks constituted racism.

It is worth noting that the U.S. lost 50,000 men in the first Korean war and a similar number in Vietnam without resorting to nuclear weapons. One can argue that these are not appropriate analogies for several reasons. First, in the Korean war of the 1950s the primary U.S. strategic concern was not Korea itself but a perceived threat of Soviet attack in Europe, so nuclear weapons were conserved for potential European use. Second, the Vietnam war—unlike Korea—provided few targets appropriate to nuclear weapons, and the casualties in Vietnam were taken over a period of many years, not in a matter of days as could be the case in Korea. These points are strong ones, but hardly decisive. In the absence of a major power threat elsewhere, or of first use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, it is almost inconceivable that an American President would approve use of nuclear weapons in a war against a relatively small, non-nuclear power. The reasons for such a Presidential judgment would be awareness of the long-term adverse consequences of establishing such a precedent, and awareness of the revulsion that would result in U.S. domestic public opinion and among U.S. allies.

The likelihood that nuclear weapons would prove unusable in the most likely form of Korean conflict, namely a pure North Korean attack on the South, sharpens the dilemma a U.S. president would face if he had previously stored nuclear weapons in South Korea. The choice would be between unacceptable use of the weapons and the unacceptability of withdrawal under fire. This dilemma would be greatly enhanced if the weapons were stationed rather relatively far forward and therefore the decision
became necessary almost immediately after the initiation of what would likely be a surprise attack. One must seriously question whether the political and morale consequences of placing the national decision-making system in the position of having to make such a choice would be compensated by the small additional deterrence obtained from having nuclear rather than merely conventional forces in Korea. Moreover, the deterrence gains would be the only gains from storing the weapons in Korea, since storage within the country would not necessarily have any warfighting advantages whatsoever over storing them elsewhere. Assuming the U.S. could maintain air access to South Korea—not the strong condition of air superiority, but merely the weaker condition of air access—nuclear warheads could be transferred from distant areas, like Guam, in a small number of days whereas the process of making a decision to fire nuclear weapons and then arming them would take at least a week and probably a minimum of two weeks. Moreover, much of the process of deployment could take place during the period when the decision was being made, so that the small transit time would not necessarily add more than a few hours beyond the time of decision.

Another potential reason for locating nuclear weapons in South Korea focuses upon the perceived necessity of reducing South Korea's incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. It is a matter of public record that South Korea is rapidly acquiring nuclear reactors, chemical industries, machine tools, and other aspects of technical capacity to make and deliver nuclear warheads, and it is also true that President Park Chung Hee has appeared to use this capability as an option to replace U.S. support. However,

the presence of U.S. conventional forces is almost certainly more valuable to South Korea than a tiny nuclear arsenal would be, particularly when one considers that acquisition of even a tiny nuclear arsenal would alienate both Japan and the United States to a degree that would probably affect both political and economic ties. Furthermore, it would be an extremely dubious policy for the United States to make itself hostage to a small ally to the extent that it would put its own President into the impossible dilemma mentioned above in order to defuse such a threat; many of the "lessons" of the Vietnam war have consisted of misreadings, but the danger of becoming hostage to small allies to such a degree would seem to be a legitimate lesson of that unfortunate conflict.

Several other potential reasons for stationing nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea relate not to Korea itself but to the larger context of Asia and the world. First, one can imagine that nuclear weapons in Korea might be useful in the event of an all-out Soviet-American nuclear exchange; however, on closer examination, it becomes clear that weapons placed in Korea for such purposes would be far more vulnerable than a Polaris submarine, Minuteman missiles, B-52 bombers, or any of the other major weapon systems and that they would add little or nothing to overall American striking power.

Second, one can imagine the possibility that U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea would greatly complicate Soviet calculations in planning an attack on China, and that the magnitude of interests at stake in a potential Sino-Soviet conflict would be appropriate to justify the risks involved in stationing weapons in Korea. However, such a cache of weapons would be so small relative to the scale of weaponry involved in such a conflict,
and their influence so small compared to the influence of a simple U.S. statement of strong interest in not allowing either power to dominate the other, that their leverage would be marginal at best. Moreover, and this is perhaps the most important point, the preferred method of affecting a possible Sino-Soviet conflict would be indirect, namely through logistic support to China rather than through creating Soviet expectations of direct American military involvement which could become self-fulfilling.

Somewhat more plausible is the use of nuclear weapons stored in Korea to facilitate defense of Japan against either Chinese or Soviet attack. Since one cannot store such weapons in either Japan or Taiwan, the only nearby land storage area is in Korea. However, once again, the details of logistics tend to render this rationale dubious. It would be possible to supply nuclear warheads to Japan, even from Guam or from positions farther back, far more rapidly than to reach a decision and then arm those weapons. Therefore, the advantages of forward storage are minimal. The countervailing disadvantages are more substantial, including both the Presidential dilemma mentioned earlier if war occurred in Korea itself, and the likelihood that, in a war for Japan, Korea would become more of point of vulnerability than a position of strength. It would certainly be rational, if the decision is made on other grounds to store nuclear weapons in Korea, to ensure the availability of contingency plans and an organizational capability to retarget those nuclear forces in order to support the defense of Japan, but defense of Japan does not play any significant role in the current U.S. military posture in Korea and does not seem to provide sufficient justification by itself for stationing nuclear forces in Korea.
Finally, there is the possibility of using nuclear weapons stationed in Korea to put pressure on the Soviet Union in the event of Soviet pressure on Europe. This possibility is far more dubious even than using such forces to deter Sino-Soviet warfare. It is true that a U.S. presence in Asia could be extremely useful in the event of Soviet threats to, or attacks on, Europe. However, supposing that one has conventional forces in Korea and Japan, plus a conspicuous naval presence in Northeast Asia, and possibly a capability to supply China with various kinds of military assistance, it is clear that nuclear weapons stationed in Korea would add no real warfighting capability, given the ease with which warheads could be transported from elsewhere, and little if any additional deterrent influence.

**Political Considerations Affecting Any Nuclear Weapons Stationed in Korea**

The above scenarios and discussions of contingencies highlight several political considerations crucial to any decision to station nuclear weapons in Korea or to withdraw such weapons.

The primary political consideration is the dilemma posed for a U.S. President, and for national policy generally if nuclear weapons are stationed in Korea and if deterrence then fails. Availability of such overwhelmingly potent weapons creates tremendous pressure on a U.S. President to use them if faced with rapid capture or destruction of U.S. forces or with the likelihood of loss of Korea. Use of the weapons would in most circumstances create dissension in the United States, in Japan, and elsewhere in the world, which would constitute political losses to the United States of a magnitude probably greater than those sustained in the Vietnam war. On the other hand, withdrawal of the weapons under fire would be
intensely embarrassing in several ways, including charges of a sellout if
the war was lost, and charges that U.S. troops were inhumanly sacrificed
even if the war were won; their withdrawal would demoralize U.S. and allied
troops operating in Korea.

Particular mention of the problem of false but potent accusations of
racism is necessary. Use of nuclear weapons against Asians, even to
defend other Asians, would be viewed in some Asian and American quarters
as a manifestation of alleged racism. The magnitude of such accusations
would be far greater and far more greater than in the 1960s because of
rising Third World consciousness and Third World hostility to the United
States. Perversely, but also unavoidably, the U.S. would face identical
charges of racism were it to withdraw nuclear weapons under fire from any
Asian battlefield. It would be argued that, because of alleged American
official racism, the U.S. was unwilling to defend Asian liberties with the
same firmness that it would employ to defend Western European liberties.
During the Vietnam war the United States was charged with racism both
because of its involvement in Vietnam and because of what the other side
perceived as the inadequate degree of U.S. involvement there. These con-
tradictory charges would be made in a Korean situation with far greater
intensity, because of the greater salience of Korea and because of the
evolution of Third World consciousness mentioned above. The same charges
will be made in the event of a purely conventional campaign, but their
political force will be marginal in the absence of the powerful emotions
associated with nuclear weapons.

Once nuclear weapons are introduced into Korea or some other country,
withdrawal of those weapons creates special problems. In the first place,
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATIONED IN ROK

A. AVAILABILITY IN ROK CREATES TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON U.S. PRESIDENT TO USE THEM IF FACED WITH DESTRUCTION OR CAPTURE OF U.S. FORCES

B. IF DECISION GOES AGAINST USE, WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER FIRE WOULD BE INTENSELY EMBARRASSING.

C. WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PEACETIME MIGHT ENCOURAGE OPPONENTS, WORRY ALLIES (JAPAN, ROK, ROC)
   -- TIMING CRUCIAL
   -- STATED RATIONALE CRUCIAL
   -- TYPES OF WEAPONS CRUCIAL
   -- KOREANS WILL ALWAYS CLAIM THAT ANY DOWNWARD FORCE ADJUSTMENT RISKS ALLIED PANIC AND LOSS OF CREDIBILITY.

D. ONCE STATIONED IN KOREA AND WITHDRAWN COMPLETELY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REINTRODUCE, EXCEPT IN WAR.

E. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ASIANS—EVEN TO DEFEND OTHER ASIANS—WOULD BE VIEWED IN SOME ASIAN AND AMERICAN QUARTERS AS A MANIFESTATION OF AMERICAN RACISM. THIS IS FAR MORE TRUE, AND FAR MORE DANGEROUS, THAN IN 1960s, BECAUSE OF THIRD WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS.

F. DANGER THAT NUCLEAR PRESENCE WILL ALLOW CONVENTIONAL WITHDRAWAL, LEAVING U.S. WITH OPTIONS IT WILL NOT USE.

G. DANGER OF POTENTIAL WEAPON CAPTURE BY SOUTH KOREANS.
once such weapons are stationed within a country and then withdrawn, reintroduction of them in a crisis tends to be extremely difficult because of the rigidification of positions within and without the government during the debates over such introduction and withdrawal; such movements of weapons raise the issue to consciousness and lead interest groups and bureaucratic factions to establish positions which become difficult to change. However, in such cases as Korea and Taiwan, the only occasions which would require reintroduction of nuclear weapons would be massive invasions involving either China or the Soviet Union as adversaries; in the event of such invasions, transport of nuclear weapons to Korea could be accomplished, as argued above, in timely fashion and with no significant additional complications in the decision process added by the previous withdrawal. Therefore this consideration is not an important one in discussing the possibility of introduction and withdrawal of nuclear weapons.

Of considerably more concern is the possibility that peacetime withdrawal of nuclear weapons might encourage adversaries and discourage allies. For instance, if newspapers were to report that nuclear weapons which had been stationed in Korea were being withdrawn from Korea, it is quite conceivable that South Korean confidence in its security would be shaken, that the Japanese would begin to question the reliability of the U.S. nuclear commitment, and that Taiwan would perceive the withdrawal from Korea as one more step in a process of disengagement which would leave Taiwan undefended by the U.S. Certainly both Korea and Taiwan would state their perceptions of any withdrawal this way, and the Japanese government would probably express the same concerns privately. That Taiwan and Korea will respond to virtually any downward adjustment in U.S. involvement
with firm statements of outrage tends to discount their position, but their stated positions cannot be dismissed out of hand.

In this case the political consequences of withdrawal depend a great deal upon the timing, the stated rationale, and the types of weapons involved in any withdrawal. For instance, suppose that, on the day after the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon, the United States had announced changes of policy involving general withdrawal from much of Asia, a statement of U.S. disinterest in future support of authoritarian regimes, a belief that the U.S. could not fight wars on the Asian mainland successfully, and a statement that large numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons were present in Korea and would be withdrawn during the following month. Such a statement would invite North Korean attack and could conceivably destroy South Korean morale, with similar manifestations following in Japan and Taiwan. However, if the same withdrawal were initiated (1) at a time when U.S. foreign policy appeared relatively successful, (2) when the South Korean economy was enjoying its normal boom, (3) within a policy context emphasizing South Korea's extraordinary economic and military successes, and (4) oriented around technical discussions of the utility or disutility of particular weapon systems, then the negative consequences for both deterrence and for allied morale need not be more than marginal. Thus the concerns about deterrence and morale are crucial, but are crucial in determining the way nuclear decisions are made and presented rather than determining the appropriateness of introducing, retaining, or withdrawing nuclear weapons.

Finally, there is a danger connected with the possible presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea which has gone largely undetected among
policy analysts. In an era of budget cutting and careful examination of U.S. bases overseas, there can be extreme pressure to cut conventional forces, because conventional forces are both expensive and highly visible. In the normal course of events, military commanders faced with constant commitments and declining conventional capabilities will naturally try to make up their losses through increasing reliance on other systems, namely nuclear weapons. Civilians viewing this process at any given time will perceive that a few thousand soldiers more or less make very little difference, particularly when there is an implicit assumption that nuclear weapons would be employed in any major conflict. Thus, additional pressure is generated for cuts in conventional forces and in turn for augmentation of nuclear forces. Thus an effective conventional force gets replaced by a transparent nuclear bluff, contrary to national intentions.

Warfighting Uses of Nuclear Weapons in Asia

From our extensive discussion of individual contingencies, several points regarding U.S. needs for nuclear warfighting capability emerge quite clearly.

First, the number of situations in which nuclear weapons are likely to be released by an American President for actual military use are extremely few, and the contingencies in which they would be used are relatively low probability contingencies. However, the contingencies are so important that they justify preparations despite low probability. The relevant contingencies are mostly located in Northeast Asia and consist primarily of defense of Japan against U.S.S.R. or PRC attack, threatening a second front against the Soviet Union in the event of large-scale European
or Middle Eastern conflicts, assisting the PRC against Soviet attack, and possibly defending South Korea, Taiwan, or a Southeast Asian country against a major power attack.

Second, of the above, only defense of Japan seems prima facie to require forward siting of nuclear weapons. In all the other cases, and perhaps even in this one, storage of warheads on ships, in Guam, Hawaii, or Alaska, or in the continental United States, would offer warfighting capability virtually identical to that provided by forward siting. In the case of Japan, where the U.S. interest is overwhelmingly large, numerous inadequacies appear in the U.S.-Japanese defense posture. Contingency planning for effective use of U.S. forces in the region to defend Japan appears totally inadequate. Planning for joint operations with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is almost totally lacking. Facilities for transport of reinforcements to Japan in the event of a conflict may be seriously deficient. Indeed, it appears that the U.S. is overequipped for conflicts of high immediacy and relatively low importance in Asia, but seriously underequipped to defend its most vital interest in the region.

Third, case by case discussion supports the view that no U.S. President is likely to be willing to initiate use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear power. That is, no American President is likely to be willing to defend a Southeast Asian country against another Southeast Asian country, or South Korea against North Korea, using nuclear weapons. Therefore, to the extent that nuclear weapons are part of the arsenal available to us in such conflicts, they should be ignored in contingency planning. Nuclear weapons will be used only against nuclear powers, either in response to attack by overwhelming conventional forces of China or the Soviet Union.
Within the time period envisioned here, namely to 1990, it is conceivable that Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Australia, and Pakistan will join India in becoming minor nuclear powers, but the emphasis here is on the word "minor," and therefore even the most extravagant extent of proliferation is unlikely to have major consequences for U.S. nuclear defense requirements in the region.

Finally, since Japan is the only case which justifies forward stockpiling of nuclear warheads, and since Japan makes a policy of not storing nuclear weapons on its soil a major facet of its foreign policy, there is no tenable case for forward land storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia. It is important to be precise regarding the implication of this rather sweeping conclusion. Forward siting means, for all practical purposes, positioning nuclear weapons on the foreign territories of the mainland of Asia and of the insular chain running south from Japan to Australia. Clearly, U.S. global nuclear strategy includes Polaris submarines operating in Asia. Clearly also, it is useful to have nuclear-capable surface forces in the region to support defense of Japan, to engage in anti-submarine warfare, to provide the apparent deterrent in Southeast Asia and Taiwan referred to earlier, and to participate in global deterrent and warfighting tasks as necessary. A general prohibition on forward storage of nuclear warheads does not imply that it would not be useful to have forward siting of certain kinds of delivery vehicles, particularly those which are difficult to transport and those which are capable of operating in both conventional and nuclear roles. Finally, the prohibition on forward land siting does not apply to such U.S. or U.S.-controlled territories as Guam, Hawaii, the Aleutians, and others.
Storage of Nuclear Weapons

In the following chart on "General Principles of Nuclear Storage" we have listed the principal considerations involved in deciding where to locate stores of nuclear warheads. The first consideration, namely that weapons should be available in time for effective use in appropriate wartime situations is the consideration which most armchair strategists would consider predominant. However, it turns out to be a criterion which almost any force posture can accommodate. The political decision to fire nuclear weapons, and other aspects of the process of deploying such forces, are sufficiently time-consuming under any but the most extreme circumstances—such as direct Soviet missile attack on the continental United States—and air transport of weapons is so rapid that no important amounts of time are sacrificed by transporting nuclear warheads to the eastern coast of Asia from Guam, Hawaii, the Aleutians, or even the continental United States. This assumes, of course, that the United States maintains air and sea access, although not necessarily air and sea superiority, so that the warheads can actually be delivered. Present U.S. forces seem adequate to ensure air and sea access except perhaps for extreme contingencies involving Soviet attacks on Japan.

Second only to ensuring availability in time of war is the principle of storing weapons in a manner which optimizes deterrence. Implementation of this deterrence principle requires balancing delicate psychological considerations and therefore is inevitably controversial. In some circumstances one may achieve complete deterrence by stationing weapons in a country where in practice they would never be used. Some scholars would allege that such a bluff is the fundamental strategy behind even the U.S. nuclear
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR STORAGE

A. AVAILABILITY: HAVE WEAPONS AVAILABLE IN TIME FOR EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT IN ALL APPROPRIATE WARFIGHTING CONTINGENCIES, INCLUDING CONTINGENCIES OF LOW PROBABILITY BUT HIGH IMPORTANCE. --TRANSIT TIME TRIVIAL COMPARED TO DECISION AND ARMAMENT TIMES --BUT NEED ASSURED AIR OR SEA ACCESS

B. DETERRENCE: USE WEAPON SITING OPTIMAL FOR DETERRENCE --IN GENERAL, LAND SITING SUPERIOR TO SEA, BUT SEE BELOW

C. BALANCE DETERRENCE VALUE OF SITING AGAINST:
   1. DANGER OF FRIENDLY OR HOSTILE CAPTURE
   2. DANGERS OF FORCED USE OR EMBARRASSMENT OF WITHDRAWAL UNDER FIRE
   3. DIPLOMATIC SENSITIVITIES
      a. STORAGE AND TRANSIT IN ANY COUNTRY CONTROVERSIAL
      b. NOTE EXTRAORDINARY SENSITIVITY OF JAPAN

D. MINIMIZE LOSS OF CREDIBILITY DUE TO ANY WITHDRAWALS BY:
   1. SECRECY
   2. SELECTIVE WITHDRAWALS
   3. INCREMENTAL WITHDRAWALS
   4. CONVENTIONAL AND ECONOMIC COMPENSATION
   5. APPROPRIATE TIMING

E. MOST POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CONTINGENCIES WOULD OCCUR IN NORTHEAST ASIA

F. INVULNERABILITY: AVOID POTENTIAL PEARL HARBORS

G. AVOID POSTURES WHICH PROVIDE AN ILLUSION OF CAPABILITY AND THUS BECOME COVERS FOR REDUCTION OF REAL CAPABILITY

H. CONCLUSIONS:
   1. WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE STORED IN FORWARD, ASIAN LAND AREAS
   2. USE OF FORWARD SITING FOR DETERRENCE IS APPROPRIATE PRINCIPALLY WHERE VITAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE
   3. LOGISTIC SYSTEMS SHOULD FOCUS ON NORTHEAST ASIAN CONTINGENCIES, PARTICULARLY DEFENSE OF JAPAN

I. LIKELY EFFECTS OF ABOVE POLICIES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WOULD BE MARGINAL AT MOST
   --PAKISTAN
   --TAIWAN
   --KOREA
   --JAPAN

J. WOULD NUCLEAR STORAGE OUTSIDE U.S. DIMINISH LIKELIHOOD THAT THEIR USE WOULD IMPLY ATTACKS ON CONUS? PROBABLY NOT.

K. NUCLEAR SITING PROBABLY HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE OVER WHETHER U.S. BECOMES A NUCLEAR TARGET FOR PRC.
presence in Europe. However, nuclear defense of Western Europe and of Japan by the United States is a quite credible policy because of the visibly vital stakes involved to the United States. By comparison, a threat to incinerate Somalia if that country's political evolution takes an unfavorable turn would not be credible. Cases like Korea and Taiwan lie in an intermediate zone between these two extremes, a zone sufficiently broad as to justify differences among reasonable men. However, the direction in which events are currently running is fairly clear. Fifteen years ago the United States was viewed as virtually omnipotent in Pacific Asia. Few Americans questioned the value of defending Taiwan, Korea, and other areas, and few foreigners doubted the intensity of American commitments. Vietnam has changed all this, and futile posturing over Angola may yet change it still more. American doubts about the value of supporting these countries are widespread and vocal, and no foreign leaders are unaware of such questioning. For the foreseeable future, the United States is a country whose bluff has been called in a Vietnam situation sufficiently embarrassing that it is not in a position to rely on bluffing as a major aspect of its defense policy.

Moreover, the reduced deterrent value of hardware siting must be assessed in conjunction with other important considerations. Forward siting in Korea would provide minimum deterrent to North Korea, combined with maximum opportunity for the North Koreans to capture U.S. nuclear weaponry, particularly if those weapons were sited relatively close to the demilitarized zone. Moreover, in Korea, in Taiwan, and elsewhere, the U.S. is dealing with allies who are quite powerful in their own right, quite determined to defend themselves at any cost, and who fear intensely
that the U.S. might abandon them at any moment; in some cases this implies a small but not negligible possibility that allied forces would, in an extreme situation, attempt to capture U.S. nuclear devices. Third, if a bluff is called and the decision goes against firing available nuclear weapons, then withdrawal under fire would entail intense embarrassment and demoralization. Finally, storage of nuclear weapons on foreign soil contains the seeds of intense diplomatic controversy. Japanese sensitivities are unique only in degree. Everywhere, except perhaps in Korea, controversies over stockpiling of nuclear weapons would always hold the potential for straining the political friendship. For instance, in the extremely friendly atmosphere of the Philippines, any overt storage of nuclear weapons would be perceived locally as cause for diplomatic denunciations and popular demonstrations. Covert storage would be difficult to sustain without a totally cooperative local administration and a more substantial capacity for sustaining secrecy than we have recently evidenced.

Where these considerations lead to a decision that nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from forward siting, the possibility of local anger or panic or loss of deterrence must be recognized as serious problems. Secret withdrawal of weapons whose presence is a true secret can of course be effective. But where the presence of nuclear weapons is an open secret, and where the withdrawal would also be an open secret, an officially covert withdrawal would be the most disastrous possible course. Leaking of the attempted covert withdrawal would maximize the loss of credibility, for the secrecy attending the withdrawal would create a presumption that the withdrawal was being conducted for shameful reasons, namely abandonment of an ally. It follows from this that the withdrawal of weapons may in some instances force abandonment of the pretense of secrecy.
Withdrawal of nuclear forces need not sacrifice credibility; indeed, properly conducted, such withdrawals may be rightly perceived as the substitution of a real tiger for a paper tiger. Withdrawals should be selective, should be carefully justified on the basis of professional strategic calculations, and should be accompanied by compensatory strengthening of local conventional capabilities and of the local economy. Above all, the timing and the larger strategic context must be appropriate to withdrawal. One cannot thin out nuclear or any other forces from important areas in the immediate wake of a debacle like Vietnam. However, particularly in the case of Korea, one can reaffirm the alliance, improve economic relationships, provide substantial conventional military assistance, and take public pride in the rising capabilities of the indigenous Korean forces, while making such other adjustments in force posture and contingency planning as are justified on strategic grounds.

A further principle of nuclear storage is that one should avoid postures which provide an illusion of capability and thus become covers for reduction of real capability. The possibility that nuclear presence in Asia could become such a cover has already occurred to some extent, and the importance of changing this needs no reiteration.

From these considerations and from the previous discussion of contingencies, one can infer the principles which should govern U.S. nuclear posture in Asia. Nuclear weapons should not be stored in forward Asian land areas. Use of forward siting for deterrence is appropriate only where U.S. interests are of such a magnitude that forward siting creates a credible deterrent, a condition satisfied only in Western Europe and Japan. Since Japan does not permit storage of nuclear weapons on her territory, all forward land siting in Asia is inappropriate.
Since the principal nuclear contingencies are located in Northeast Asia, logistic systems for nuclear warfare should obviously be focused on Northeast Asia. Since Japan is the country of principal concern to the United States, defense of Japan should be the preeminent consideration in regional U.S. posture. To state these principles in such bald form is to sound platitudinous, but these principles have frequently not been followed in the past and, to a substantial extent, are not being followed today. It is crucial that defense of Japan become the focal point of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy in Asia.

This focus on Japan entails further implications for the structure of U.S. forces designed for Asian contingencies. Japan is a country of extraordinarily dense population and concentrated industrial capacity. A major nuclear attack could devastate it over night. The destruction which would be entailed by nuclear conflict in Japan itself would be far greater even than the destruction entailed by tactical nuclear warfare in Europe. It is therefore imperative that conventional capabilities to assist in Japan's defense be stretched to the fullest in order to minimize the necessity of using nuclear weapons. Insofar as possible, hostile forces should be engaged away from Japanese soil. And to the extent that nuclear weapons are envisaged for use in Japan's defense, they should be the cleanest, most precise, and smallest (in terms of blast) weapons that are technologically feasible.

If nuclear weapons are not to be stored in forward land areas, where should they be stored, and how should they be carried? As argued above, nuclear naval forces should be a crucial part of the overall nuclear force. Strategic submarines will of course operate in the region. Submarines
without strategic missiles but with stockpiles of certain kinds of warheads could prove an important supplement to warheads supplied by air; they would be less vulnerable to prior destruction than surface ships would be. Surface ships with anti-submarine nuclear capabilities, with nuclear capabilities for destruction of troop transports and other hostile naval forces, and with nuclear anti-aircraft capabilities, would be extremely useful in the crucial Japanese contingencies. They might also play some role in extreme Korean or Taiwanese contingencies if major power forces are involved. This assumes, of course, that their vulnerability would not be so great as to preclude participation in a potentially nuclear Soviet attack on Japan.

Clearly, any defense of Japan will be heavily dependent upon massive airlift of men, conventional weapons, and nuclear warheads. These could reasonably be based in Hawaii, Guam, the Aleutians, or similar sites. The nuclear-equipped forces designed for such contingencies should possess high competence, instant readiness, and unusual mobility. These requirements are easier to meet with a relatively small force, but there are dangers in small size and compact location. It is imperative that the cream of U.S. nuclear capability not be vulnerable to sudden destruction. One Pearl Harbor in this century is enough, and any war of sufficient importance to involve nuclear weapons is a war of sufficient importance to involve a high probability of surprise attack. Therefore, redundancy, hardness, and dispersion are central characteristics for the forces to be used in nuclear defense of Japan. This does not mean that an elite nuclear striking force could not be created under a single command, but it does seem to imply some combination of frequent movement, geographical
fragmentation, and redundancy. An elite force of modest size would need to be complemented by some minimal level of nuclear fighting capability dispersed among other units--to hedge against the elite forces meeting sudden disaster. It is not the purpose of this essay to suggest the specific size or composition or location of such forces, but these are the general principles around which the forces should be constructed.

Would such siting and such force structures have the adverse consequences of nuclear proliferation and increased likelihood that the U.S. itself would become a nuclear target? In both cases the adverse consequences seem unlikely. The U.S. has already committed itself to gradual withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Taiwan, and this implies that general political and economic relationships, together with overall U.S. military capabilities in the region, are the determinants of future U.S. leverage over Taiwan's nuclear decisions. None of these is substantially affected by a choice of mid-Pacific or U.S.-based nuclear posture. In Korea, inhibitions regarding proliferation derive from the presence of U.S. forces, from the need for secure sources of energy, and from economic relationships with the United States and Japan. So long as U.S. conventional forces remain in Korea, the threat to withdraw those forces will act as an effective inhibition against proliferation. Withdrawal of the conventional forces will put the primary burden of inhibiting proliferation on to Japan's shoulders. Thus the key to U.S. leverage over potential Korean proliferation rests with the conventional presence, not with any nuclear presence.

Potential Japanese proliferation would result from changes in the composition of the Japanese government, over which the U.S. has virtually
no leverage, from major security shocks administered by the Soviet Union, China or OPEC, in which case the overall strength of the U.S. political, economic and military response will overwhelm the influence of nuclear siting; or from Korean and Taiwanese proliferation, which as discussed above, do not depend primarily on U.S. nuclear siting. No conceivable changes in U.S. nuclear posture would affect the likelihood of Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the positioning of U.S. stockpiles of nuclear warheads will affect nuclear proliferation adversely.

It remains important to consider whether nuclear storage policies could affect the likelihood of nuclear attacks on the continental United States. This question has two parts. The first part is whether nuclear siting could influence whether the U.S. becomes a nuclear target for the People's Republic of China. Clearly, if China believed that the U.S. possessed territorial or other aggressive designs on China, then China would target the U.S. In the abstract it seems conceivable that nuclear storage decisions could affect China's view of this question. But in fact China seems to recognize that the U.S. possesses no such designs, and none of the available options for changing the U.S. nuclear posture would be likely to change Chinese perceptions regarding this issue. It seems likely, therefore, that China's decisions on targeting will depend upon the intensity of the conflict with the Soviet Union, and upon Chinese sense of whether there are political conflicts with the United States of a magnitude sufficient to justify an attempt to employ nuclear deterrence. The principal issues of such a magnitude are probably Taiwan, and perhaps Chinese offshore territorial waters and seabed claims. In neither case
would U.S. nuclear siting constitute a major factor determining the evo-

tution of Chinese targeting or the way in which conflict might be precip-
itated.

There remains the larger issue of whether stationing nuclear weapons
outside the United States would diminish the likelihood that using those
weapons would lead to attacks on the United States itself. It seems
logical to suppose that, if weapons are launched from Point X, the recip-
ient might be inspired to retaliate against Point X, and therefore it
would be useful to have Point X located at, say, Guam, rather than, for
instance, San Francisco. One cannot deny the emotional force of such an
argument. On the other hand, among the current major nuclear powers, there
has been an evident and apparently successful effort to think through the
consequences of nuclear weapons, and to employ them in a careful and
responsible pursuit of policy goals. To the extent that reason dominates
primitive emotion, one would expect calculations of military value and
political purpose to override any gut desire to retaliate against a spe-
cific geographical point. For instance, if missiles are shot from the
middle of a New Mexico desert onto a Chinese city, one would not expect a
Chinese missile to be targeted at the desert; one would expect to lose
either a city or a military outpost. Likewise, if for the sake of the
argument, one imagines that a missile were launched from Chicago against
a weapons depot on one of the Paracel Islands, that the Chinese target of
choice in retaliation would more likely be a similar installation on Guam
rather than the point of origin in Chicago. Such reasoning is hardly
decisive, but it suggests that the balance of intuition is slightly on the
side of a belief that the origin of a strike is not so important as the
target of the strike in determining what the likely response will be.
The nuclear posture suggested here is limited in the contingencies it addresses, focused on those interests (in Japan) which are most vital to the United States, and based rather far back in the Pacific rather than forward on allied territory. It is a posture far more effective than current proclivities in addressing those few threats which actually are potentially nuclear, but far less likely to induce unnecessary adverse consequences than a more forward, less focused nuclear posture.