Recent American foreign policy has achieved important successes—rapprochement with China, withdrawal from Vietnam, SALT, parts of the Middle East negotiations. The chief American foreign policy spokesman has become widely recognized as the world's most skillful negotiator. In many areas an America which once merely reacted to others has gained the initiative. And yet the sweet taste of these successes seems constantly to give way to a bitter after-taste. The American people respond with apathy or opposition to major foreign policy initiatives. Our allies distrust us. Much of the Third World regards us as a principal opponent.

Both the successes and the bitter after-taste have coincided with a crucial transformation of the way politically active Americans discuss foreign policy. Historically, the debate over foreign policy has focused on moral and moralistic considerations. A plethora of concerns—sympathy for the starving, anger over political oppression, opposition to aggressive war, concern for formal legality, and fear over American economic and political security—were brought to bear on such foreign policy issues as Japan's Twenty-One Demands, U-boat activities in World War I, Hitlerian and Japanese expansion, the occupation of Eastern Europe, post-World War II decolonization, the Korean War, the Marshall Plan, foreign aid, Suez, Berlin, and the like. Always, a keen eye has focused on economic interests and on major direct military threats (Hitler, Stalin), but in most crises and major policy turning points the fulcrum of the debate tended to be moral and legal—or moralistic and legalistic. In effect, the
key question reduced to a simple, "What is right?" That question hastened post World War II decolonization, facilitated European and Japanese recovery from the war, and gave U.S. alliances their indispensible moral core. But the same question also frequently got America into trouble, by involving us in things we might better have left alone. It was a question which could be given unlimited emphasis only in an era of apparently unlimited U.S. resources. The glory of the old question, of the moralistic approach to foreign policy, was the Marshall Plan; its nemesis was Vietnam. At its best the old question gave us morals and morale and sympathy for others, at its worst it gave us moralism and legalism and interventionism.

Disillusioned with the rigid applications of the old question to Vietnam and to the complexities of polycentric communism, America has been guided by the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford administration to a new central question: "How will the balance of power be affected?" This question America has always asked, but it has been the fulcrum of policy only on occasions of extreme peril -- such as the decision to fight World War II in Europe first and Asia later. The new pre-eminence of the balance of power question greatly facilitated withdrawal from Vietnam, and probably minimized the adverse domestic consequences of that withdrawal. It also facilitated the rapprochement with China, the achievement of strategic arms limitation agreements (some of which are of questionable value), and the maintenance of diplomatic motion in the Middle East.

The other side of nearly exclusive emphasis on balance of power considerations, focused heavily on military balance and on relations
with adversaries, has been deteriorating relations with allies, rising American public cynicism about foreign policy, and emphasis on balance of power considerations in Chile, in Angola, in relations with the Third World generally, and in other areas where the balance of power is in fact affected very little but where crucial moral and political values seem to most of America and to most of the world to be very much at stake.

Certainly it is important to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union. But maintaining a balance of power is a means, not an end. The end is the protection of the integrity, liberty, and prosperity of America and of other free nations. There are other means which are important, and in most Third World crises other means are more important.

Southern Africa and the recent Angola crisis provide an archetypes case. Administration spokesmen have emphasized the importance of Soviet political influence, of damage to U.S. credibility, of possible Soviet naval or other military bases, and so forth. Prior to the recent crisis, U.S. policy toward this unhappy region consisted primarily (though not exclusively) of supporting the colonial power, Portugal, against indigenous nationalists, out of fear of losing access to Portuguese bases. As Angolan independence came nearer, and the end of the Salazar regime approached, and U.S. transport facilities became less dependent on such bases, one would have thought that this already misguided policy would have changed, but instead it was strengthened by U.S. willingness to let aircraft obtained from the U.S. be used to transport troops from Portugal to Angola. The balance of power considerations which dominated decisions were objectively trivial -- at
least so long as America did not place itself directly in opposition to the tides of decolonization and of struggle against minority racial domination.

But the moral and political stakes were very high indeed, and the Administration utterly failed to articulate these. Perhaps even more important, much of the politically active public tacitly accepted the Administration's definition of the stakes; oriented by the Administration, most of the public debated whether or not the outcome in Angola could greatly affect American security or the Soviet-American balance. Not surprisingly, the majority of public and Congress concluded that neither security nor overall balance was in jeopardy. This conclusion, together with distaste for the Administration's choice of covert means of intervention, doomed the Administration policy.

Most of the world agrees about the nature of the stakes in Angola, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The real stakes are ideological, political, and moral. Long-term influence in the region is gained or lost in accordance with one's perceived orientation to these fundamental stakes. Freedom from Soviet influence, and freedom from potential local totalitarian political systems are important stakes, and are generally recognized as such in Africa, but the immediate dangers to freedom take the forms of racism and colonialism. Have we heard the Administration identify freedom consistently as the central issue? How often did the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford Administration denounce racism and colonialism -- prior to the time when such denunciations came as a much-too-late tactical move? Is freedom only a tactical weapon for use in struggles over the balance of power? Do we care about freedom itself, including freedom from colonialism and racial domination, or only about freedom from Soviet influence?
If freedom is the central issue, how are we to deduce that from Administration statements and policies? More important, how are the Africans to deduce it? Most of Africa has deduced just the opposite.

By articulating American interests almost exclusively in balance of power terms, the present Administration has obscured the principal U.S. concerns. Rightly or wrongly, what has been communicated to the American people, and to potential friends abroad, is a cold search for American political/military advantage at the direct expense of a concern for the liberty of the people concerned. Moreover, unnecessarily covert decisions and covert aid communicate a disregard for democratic processes at home.

Interestingly, many liberals have joined a conservative Administration in emphasizing military and balance of power considerations at the expense of traditional values. When the Sino-Soviet split became open, and it became clear that we would probably never again face a unified communist bloc, many liberals came very close to announcing that the struggle with communism was essentially irrelevant. After all, if the two great communist powers canceled each other out militarily, what was all the fuss about? The fuss was about liberty, of course. It was not usually about democracy, a scarce commodity in this world, but it was about liberty. I for one do not wish to live in world of communist countries, even if they are small, mutually competing, and militarily harmless. On this kind of issue American conservatives and American liberals have engaged in a dialogue of the deaf. Challenged by liberals about undifferentiated support for authoritarianism in Korea, Spain, Portugal, and elsewhere, conservatives typically replied with simplistic anti-communism -- as if there were only one way to oppose communism. Challenged by conservatives about
the singlemindedness with which they attack our allies, and about the frequent, facile equating of authoritarianism (South Korea) with totalitarianism (North Korea), liberals typically replied that the conservatives didn't understand that we no longer faced monolithic communism. Neither conservatives nor liberals wasted much energy cherishing and nurturing democracy and liberty in those parts of the Third World -- Malaysia, the Philippines, Chile, Lebanon -- which have, mostly in the past, enjoyed periods when those values flourished.

So long as this recent overemphasis on balance of power persists, it will be impossible to rejuvenate American public support for foreign policy. It will be impossible to mobilize international enthusiasm for constructive initiatives. And it will be impossible to reverse the trend whereby the nation once symbolized primarily by the Statue of Liberty is becoming perceived abroad mainly as one of two superpowers symbolized by nuclear missiles. For the United States a pure balance of power policy will inevitably defeat itself.

All of this suggests a need to reexamine the central purposes of U.S. foreign policy, with an eye first to detecting the most serious problems, second to deriving the policy consequences.

Foreign policy protects the physical integrity of the nation. But while physical defense is overwhelmingly important, and requires vast expenditures, it is not our most salient problem. We are invulnerable to invasion. We can be attacked only by a nation willing to cease its own existence. Terrorism is dangerous but limited -- so long as we prevent the rise of nuclear terrorism. Thus physical security demands substantial efforts but is not an area of great vulnerability.
Likewise, foreign policy protects our economic interests. Those interests are important. They include trade, investments, and access to raw materials. But the American economy is not particularly vulnerable. Trade is a small proportion of our national product. Our lines of trade are reasonably secure. Our foreign investments are large but not vital to our prosperity or our security. We can be damaged by an oil embargo, but not crippled by one. Boycotts of other raw materials would be annoying, but historically they would prove to be merely inconveniences. Others need our trade and our markets more than we do, and even a world of politically hostile nations would continue most trade with us. I do not wish to denigrate either physical security or economic security, but they are not the heart of the American approach to foreign policy. The heart of American foreign policy is political and moral. The vulnerabilities of America are primarily political.

The first priority of American foreign policy must be to provide an environment in which democracy and liberty can prosper. Democracy cannot prosper in an environment of threat and fear. A hostile world devoted to anti-democratic principles would -- even if divided against itself -- threaten the United States. It would not necessarily threaten our physical security. And it would not necessarily damage our economy irreparably. But a world of closed societies, hostile to us, and engaged in military competition with us, would threaten our political institutions. And those institutions -- of freedom and democracy -- are what Americans value most. We have already seen in recent years the dangers to democracy that can arise from institutions innocently created to cope with real foreign dangers. Our intelligence and security agencies, and our political staffs,
all of which are necessary, can, in a context of fear generated by foreign problems, become bases which unprincipled people can use -- even unintentionally -- to subvert our freedoms. Moreover, certain international trends -- such as nuclear proliferation and the subsequent rise of nuclear terrorism -- could, unchecked, force the adoption of controls and surveillance utterly incompatible with traditional liberty and privacy.

U.S. foreign policy is also concerned with the liberty and welfare of non-Americans. When starvation, or war, or oppression, or injustice, occur abroad, Americans are concerned. We cannot help sharing others' aspirations for freedom, prosperity, safety and justice. We are morally engaged with the rest of the world. The American people would not -- and should not -- tolerate a government which would stand idly by while other peoples starved, or were conquered, or suffered torture, or were oppressed by totalitarian regimes. When Americans perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the world is evolving in immoral directions, they frequently respond by attacks on their own government, attacks that can endanger liberty at home. McCarthyism was in part such an attack.

Thus the fundamental goal of American foreign policy is to preserve an open global society, a global society conducive to the freedom and welfare of ourselves and others. We seek a pluralistic world, a world which values freedom and democracy, a world of flexible relationships and cultural interchange, a world of peace. The questions are: how to move toward such a world; how to relate current problems to our values; how to strive toward the traditional American values of freedom, prosperity, justice, and security, in a confusing situation.

Current Problems in Light of American Values

In view of the Ford administration, and of much of the media, America
is a weakened nation, perhaps even a nation experiencing historical decline. Such a view contradicts the historical record.

If one goes back to the fears and aspirations of this country after World War II, one finds that American aspirations have largely been achieved. The great democracies have been protected and have achieved prosperity. Japan has been added to the roster of prosperous industrial democracies. Most Third World countries have attained a degree of national cohesion and governmental competence that could not reasonably have been anticipated in 1950. Although democracy has proved beyond their grasp, their people mostly enjoy liberty and reject totalitarianism. Most of the Third World has achieved modest economic growth, and a growing number of countries is achieving spectacular growth. Problems still abound, but we live in a world far safer and more prosperous and more secure in basic liberties than Harry Truman would have thought likely. Certainly it is a far better world than our forefathers of a century, or two centuries, ago would ever have dreamed. We may therefore approach our problems with the confidence that should come from having bet successfully on freedom and self-determination and growth.

Our failures are more than balanced by those of our adversaries. NATO has been weakened in southern Europe, but the Soviet Union has seen its strongest ally, China, become its greatest enemy. We have suffered a reverse in Angola, but the Soviet Union has had a greater reverse in Egypt. We lost in Vietnam, but the Soviet Union lost more in Portugal and the Middle East. Our economy has endured temporary recession, theirs has a permanent agricultural crisis. Above all, our allies are true allies, whereas theirs await an opportunity for liberation.

Most of the current problems that beset American foreign policy appear in an entirely different light when perceived by someone whose vision is
focused upon traditional American values. For instance:

In the industrialized world we find ourselves no longer dominant to the extent we were immediately after World War II. To the current administration, and to many leading intellectuals, we are therefore in an era variously characterized as the decline of America, or the weakening of America, or the retreat of American power. If relative power is what we care most about, then such descriptions are accurate. But in light of the goals of American foreign policy after World War II, and in light of traditional American values, such a description is grossly inaccurate. By those lights what has happened is the triumph of a successful American foreign policy of promoting the recovery of most of the world from World War II, with an emphasis on ensuring the continued security and prosperity and independence of the great democracies. These goals have have been achieved. We have always sought independent allies, not subordinate satraps. The Spenglerian vision of Kissinger is therefore inappropriate.

In the cloudy light of pure Realpolitik we appear beset in Panama by a pesky dictatorial regime which threatens traditional American interests. A policy concerned primarily with power focuses on retaining as much control as possible while avoiding guerrilla warfare. But a longer range perspective, informed by American values, will perceive the maturing, in Panama and throughout Latin America, of the values of self-determination and nationalism which we believe in for ourselves and which we have traditionally supported in others. In this perspective, we will respect the Panamanians' goals and recognize that in a similar position we would seek them ourselves. This does not mean that negotiations will be simple or that our interests and the Panamanians' will be easily reconciled. But if we begin from a position of respect for Panamanian -- and our own -- values, then we will automatically have given Panama most of what it seeks at no cost to ourselves.

In Angola and Rhodesia we face ugly guerrilla warfare, with Soviet involvement and some danger of the rise of regimes influenced by the Soviet Union and possibly repressive of popular freedom. But a longer range perspective would emphasize American enthusiasm for the ending of colonialism in Africa, American applause for the termination of racial oppression, and American determination to promote these causes. It required no special genius to foresee that colonialism and racism would eventually bring strife and danger to southern Africa, and that Portugal and its supporters would eventually lose. Regrettably, when we supported Portugal, America momentarily lost its sense of values and its appreciation of the flow of history. Henceforth, let us celebrate liberty and promote it, vigorously and openly. Let us seize opportunity rather than quavering at minor dangers.

In the Third World generally we find ourselves denounced as rich and comfortable and uncaring by a large number of impoverished
nations. So far we have reacted with fear of cartels and with anger at their rhetoric. But once again a more generous vision, truer to American ideals, provides different perspectives. We have in fact little to fear from the Third World, either from cartels (even oil) or from political denunciation or from military action. What is new and important is that, for the first time, the impoverished former colonies of the world have the domestic unity, the sense of opportunity, and the intellectual resources to articulate a vision of a more prosperous and equitable world, and to plan and cooperate in the service of that vision. That this is so means that our hopes for those countries are coming true, that our aid programs and our support for their self-determination have not been in vain. Many of their demands are consistent with our own, including the request for stable raw materials prices. Most of their disagreements with us are negotiable. And their ultimate vision of a more prosperous, more equitable world, in which the dignity and self-determination of every nation is respected, is a vision which we share completely. So let us approach them with confidence rather than fear, with respect rather than anger. Let us celebrate their successes. Let us negotiate vigorously, but let us never lose sight of our shared vision.

In short, these problems are the growing pains of successful policies. They are small prices which we pay for large successes in terms of traditional American values. We must put aside the current exaggeration of our problems. Let us act with strategic vision in addition to tactical ingenuity.

What We Stand For

Let us also put aside negativism in our discussion of American policies. Too much of our foreign policy has emphasized what we are against, neglected what we are for. We are against the spread of totalitarian regimes, but surely anti-communism by itself is a sterile policy. We are against dictatorships, as in Angola and Chile. But too often we stop there. What are we for? We are for liberty, democracy, peace, justice, and prosperity.

We are for democracy, and our policies toward -- for instance -- Malaysia should reflect our admiration for their democracy. We should promote liberty rather than merely denouncing dictatorships. We should give advantages to open societies rather than simply trying to punish dictators. We should celebrate the rise of freedom in Portugal
and Spain rather than merely becoming obsessed by Communist influence in southern Europe. We should rejoice at the evidence that the desire for human liberty has proved nearly universal, rather than merely reacting with great fear to those few instances where a minority threatens liberty. We must vigorously seek new ways to relate to the aspirations of each Eastern European nation, rather than assuming that the suppression of liberty is always permanent.

We should seek new ways to employ the United Nations in the search for peace, rather than being stunned when other countries express interests contrary to ours.

We should celebrate the extraordinary successes of many countries (Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Brazil, Algeria, the Arab countries) in improving the welfare of their people, instead of merely publicizing economic tragedies. We should celebrate successes in land reform, and facilitate current land reform programs, such as the one in the Philippines.

We will not, of course, appease totalitarianism, or encourage dictators, or ignore starvation. We shall not ignore the existence of problems. But negativism is a sign of intellectual and moral bankruptcy. We must no longer act and feel as old men, fearing change, pitying ourselves every time a challenge arises, grieving over minor reverses in the midst of historic success.

Foreign Aid

This emphasis on what we stand for applies with particular force to American economic aid programs. We do not provide economic aid primarily because we fear communism, although we do believe that prosperity will relieve some pressures for political oppression. We do not provide aid primarily for short run political advantage. We do not provide aid because
we fear that the Third World might successfully gang up on us. We provide foreign aid, and we hope to provide more generous foreign aid, because it is right. We help because we share a common humanity with the world's poor. We help because we care.

We have today a historical opportunity to redirect our aid in more promising directions. Too often in the past our aid has been like some domestic welfare programs, a mere charity program which, even when it has been generous, has failed to promote the dignity and self-reliance of the recipient. Instead of helping the people of the Third World to help themselves, our aid has frequently swamped local initiative and induced a psychology of dependence. We must begin to explore forms of aid that enhance local initiative and reward a psychology of self-reliance.

First, we must help to fund those commodity price stabilization programs which promise to ensure stable prices and supplies to developed and developing nations alike.

Second, we must roll back protectionist barriers which deprive the poor countries of their best markets and which deprive Americans of inexpensive shoes, clothing, and basic commodities which are most efficiently produced in the poor countries.

Third, we must explore new forms of financial guarantees which would give the poor nations greater access to private credit.

American Values and Foreign Policy: The Painful Choices

The values America seeks to further in its foreign policy include democracy, liberty, security, prosperity, and justice. It would be most fortunate if these values were always consistent with one another. Regrettably, attainment of one goal often requires delaying attainment of another. In everyday life we must frequently choose between buying a
new house and sending a child to college, between working harder for a promotion and spending more time with our families. We face equally difficult choices in foreign policy. The dilemma of foreign policy is to make painful choices while remaining true to central American values.

We have not been sufficiently true to our values. In Chile we contributed to undermining a democratically elected government. Henceforth we must give great weight to the verdict of the ballot box, just as we would at home, even when the results displease us or seem occasionally perverse because of the niceties of election laws.

Similarly, in Africa we have too frequently taken the side of colonial relationships which have been both unjust and doomed. Americans' sense of justice is affronted when we allow ourselves to become allies of colonialism or racial oppression -- and that affronting of our most basic values is far more important than temporary Soviet diplomatic influence or access to a military base.

In these cases and others we have suffered by taking a cringing attitude toward the flow of history which has led us to err on the side of third-order balance of power considerations at the expense of central American values.

Elsewhere it is not always so easy to know precisely how to be true to our values. Most of the countries of the world are not democracies; most of them have aspired to democracy but for various reasons have failed. We cannot isolate ourselves from the great majority of the world's peoples because of that failure. Instead, we must sympathize
with their problems -- of poverty, of economic inequality, of disunity, of insecurity -- and help to improve the prospects for a democratic future. These countries face their own painful choices. We must respect their right to make their own choices, even when those choices occasionally offend us, and we must remain rather modest concerning our own ability to advise or guide them. For instance:

Much of the world faces painful choices between democracy and economic growth. Where intense poverty and sometimes even starvation threaten, Americans naturally sympathize with a priority for economic growth. In politically divided countries, with relatively new governments, political disorder drives away investment. Moreover, the ability of organized pressure groups to impose their will on weak governments frequently causes extraordinary inflation. Then growth ceases, and poverty becomes ever more oppressive. Regrettably there are times when democratic freedom of organization perpetuates disorder, and enhances the power of pressure groups over weak governments. Thus, unfortunately, the great economic takeoffs of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Brazil, Algeria, and others, have derived in part from the rise of authoritarian government.

Korea is perhaps the most painful example. Before the Park Chung-hee regime, Korea's political weaknesses prevented growth and perpetuated misery in one of the world's poorest societies. During the Park regime Korea has experienced the highest growth rates in world history. Security fears, a 1300-year-old authoritarian tradition, and the political dynamics of the current regime have given rise to authoritarianism far greater than seems justifiable, however, and this poses painful choices for us. On balance, the prosperity of South Korea, the relative liberty the South enjoys compared to the North, the virtually unanimous desire of the Korean people for our continued support, and the possible danger to Japanese democracy if the North should conquer the South, lead us to decide that we must continue to support South Korea. But we must always make clear that we are defending the Korean people, not the current regime, and that increasingly arbitrary rule in South Korea will inevitably erode the American people's willingness to vote for generous support.

Many countries face the same choice between growth and freedom of political organization. In addition to Korea, such countries as Taiwan, Singapore, Brazil and Algeria have achieved extraordinary economic growth in part through strong political tactics. The vast majority
of their people nonetheless enjoy substantial liberty, and the possibility of democracy in the future remains open and continues to improve.

Likewise, many countries face a choice between Western democratic institutions and economic equity. Where history has created economic divisions between powerful landlords and impoverished peasants, American values support land reform. Unfortunately, land reform is not always consistent with Western democratic institutions. With freedom of organization, landlords organize, and peasants cannot organize. Landlords take reprisals against individual peasants, and government cannot protect those peasants. Parliaments composed of landholders refuse to vote for reform. Landlords hire expensive lawyers and tie down reform in the courts, whereas impoverished and unschooled peasants remain helpless in the adversary process. Such has been the experience of land reform in the Philippines and elsewhere, and without land reform democracy cannot long survive. Thus there are times when authoritarianism can be a prerequisite for future democracy. We grieve that the world is constructed this way. But it is, and we must face this.

Because we face difficult choices in a complex and imperfectly understood world, our decisions will frequently be imperfect and debatable. No philosopher has provided us with any sure guide to choices between democracy and economic welfare. No economist has measured how much economic growth a hungry nation can gain from increments of authoritarianism. But a compass with a margin of error is better than no compass at all. Complexity need not immobilize us, but it does justify considerable patience and modesty in our relations with societies.
facing these painful choices. Too many friendly nations like the Philippines have found themselves denounced by us for choosing democracy without land reform in one era, then denounced again later for having land reform without democracy. Acknowledgment of the necessity for choice and respect for self-determination both imply modesty rather than self-righteousness.

What is crucial is that we never lose sight of basic values when we make our decisions. Above all, we must cease to let all our choices hinge upon the single issue of competition with the Soviet Union for short-run political influence. The reason we seek influence is to promote freedom. Freedom must therefore never be sacrificed for influence.

To say that maintenance of a balance of power is a means to protect freedom is to acknowledge the great importance of maintaining a balance of power -- preferably a balance in our favor. Japan and Western Europe would not today consist primarily of democracies were it not for diligent U.S. efforts to counterbalance anti-democratic powers. Power is important and military might is essential. But the means must be subordinated to the end -- in our perceptions of the world, in our foreign policy choices, and in our major institutions. The central reason for the forced resignation of President Nixon was the extent to which his Administration employed national security policies and institutions to infringe liberties rather than to protect them. The subordination of means to ends has not yet been completed.

The Making of Foreign Policy

That the purpose of influence is to enhance freedom is true above all at home in the United States. And this means that American freedom and democracy must never be infringed on the grounds of national security.
If we invade our citizens' privacy, or harass our nation's social movements, or subvert the opposition political party, or deceive our elected representatives, then we wound ourselves to a degree no adversary could ever hope to achieve. National security must be defined as defense of our democratic institutions. It must never become an excuse for modifying them.

Our insistence that foreign concerns not be allowed to become excuses for subverting our domestic institutions applies outside government as well as inside it. We must not permit bribery and other forms of corruption to become standard business practices. Where such practices have already become established, we must root them out. The maintenance of unaccounted funds, the falsification of records, and other similar practices, are of course common in much of the world. But we can do business without them, and in the end we will be more efficient and more successful without them. Such corruption cannot be practiced by our great corporations in foreign lands and kept away from our own soil. Corruption abroad quickly involves executives in this country, and affects accounting practices in this country, and poisons relationships with our government and with other American firms. In short, if we practice corruption abroad we shall inevitably practice it at home. We must not tolerate such corrosion of our institutions and principles.

Similarly, we must not conceal from the American people the main lines of our foreign policy. If we deny our citizens the information they need to think and vote responsibly, then we subvert our own democracy. If we are going to initiate a major rapprochement with an adversary, or if we are going to take one side rather than another in a sub-continental war, then the American people must be the first to know
about it, not the last.

Just as we owe information about the major lines of our policies
to our own people, so also we owe it to our allies. Our primary foreign
allegiances are to the great democracies of Western Europe and Japan.
The defense of freedom rests as heavily on them as on us. They share
with us the consequences of our policies. We owe it to them to be
open and honest about our policies, and to involve them in the making
of those policies. If leaks or disagreements cause some damage to
our policies as a result of our openness, as inevitably they will,
then we will deal with those problems on their merits. But these
marginal problems must not be allowed to entice us into relationships of
greater confidentiality with our adversaries than with our allies. Nor
must they ever subvert the principal theme of our foreign policy. That
theme is the unity of the democracies.

America needs a foreign policy it can be proud of. Otherwise the
decline of popular faith in our institutions -- a decline vividly por-
trayed in all recent public opinion polls -- will continue to the point
where we will lack the support necessary to any coherent foreign policy.
Public confidence can never be restored by lecturing to the people on
the need for unity. Unity and confidence must be earned, not demanded.
This means that we must approach international problems in terms of a
vision defined by fundamental American values; I have indicated how
different some key problems appear in light of such a larger vision. If
we approach our problems in terms of a vision we can be proud of, then
we will reach decisions that we can be proud of. And then the American
people will have a government they can be proud of.